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ROBERT MOSES AND THE REAL ESTATE CITY: A REEXAMINATION OF THE LEGACY 
OF NEW YORK’S MASTER BUILDER  
A Thesis 
Presented to  






 Throughout the four centuries New York City has existed, there has not been a more 
controversial figure than Robert Moses. Beginning in the 1930s, Moses used billions in public 
money to completely reshape the city’s built environment, road network, and public space. Over 
a period of almost three decades, the city’s Park Commissioner and “master builder” bulldozed 
not only his opposition but also large swaths of the city’s built environment, pushing through 
numerous projects which would change the landscape of New York City forever. By the middle 
of the 1960s, Moses’s career was over, and he left office with a sullied reputation that has not 
recovered even today. Nonetheless, his influence on New York is still evident in the modern day 
in the form of his infrastructure projects, urban renewal schemes, and parks.  
 The development of New York City has taken a variety of different forms since Moses 
fell from power in the mid-twentieth century. Over a decade of deindustrialization, 
suburbanization, and fiscal crisis left the city center in disarray by the end of the 1970s and into 
the mid-1980s. Beginning in the 1990s, the modern development path of New York began to take 
shape as the government began to collaborate with private real estate developers, reshaping the 
urban landscape and ushering in a new era of prosperity. In the twenty-first century, real estate 
has become the driving force of the city economy, as public-private partnerships preside over 
small- and large-scale urban development projects both in Manhattan as well as the outer 
boroughs.  
 This trend of real estate development, while in many ways different from development in 
the Moses era, provides the historical context for reexamining his legacy and impact on the city. 
In fact, the current large-scale development projects going on in New York City suggest that it is 
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necessary to reconsider the legacy of Robert Moses. This framework of this paper will analyze 
the history of New York’s development both before and after Moses, as well as in the present day 
and into the future. In doing so, this essay seeks to provide a comprehensive examination of 
Moses’s legacy, updated in terms of contemporary New York.  
 In terms of research questions, there are a few that this paper will attempt to answer. First 
and foremost, perhaps, is the question of how to reconcile the career and legacy of Moses with 
the recent real estate development practices in New York City. Moreover, this paper will seek to 
answer questions about why Moses has endured such a negative legacy since the last years of his 
career up until the twenty-first century, and why this legacy still seems to dominate the public 
perception of him in New York today. In conjunction with this question, this paper will aim to 
answer questions regarding the legacy of Moses’s most famous opponent, Jane Jacobs, 
particularly regarding how her legacy has only benefitted from the negative perception 
surrounding Moses. Beyond questions of legacy, this paper will attempt to answer questions 
about what exactly modern development practices in contemporary New York City entail, how 
they differ from the city’s development in the past, and how they will continue to evolve. While 
the answers to these questions inevitably have a great impact on the legacy of Robert Moses, 
they should also provide valuable insight in terms of the city’s history and its potential future.  
 There has been a substantial amount of literature about New York City’s development 
throughout history, Moses’s legacy and impact on New York, and modern real estate practices in 
the city. In terms of the city’s development prior to the Moses era, this paper will draw on The 
Unfinished City, written by Thomas Bender in 2002. This book recounts the development of New 
York City in its earliest stages in the early 19th century as the city began to expand northward 
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from its original locus in Downtown Manhattan, a time that saw the adoption of the grid plan that 
has shaped the city’s built environment to this day as well as the incorporation of the outer 
boroughs towards the end of the century. Regarding the career and legacy of Robert Moses, 
Robert Caro’s seminal 1975 work, The Power Broker, is perhaps the most influential piece of 
literature in terms of understanding Moses’s negative reputation in New York City, detailing 
exactly what made Moses so controversial and largely reviled by the end of his career as well as 
in the following decades. 
 In order to properly consider Moses’s ongoing legacy, it is imperative to look at 
development practices in the five decades since his fall from power. John Logan (1987) was one 
of the first to identify the importance of real estate in terms of shaping urban areas. Saskia Sassen 
(1991) identified New York as one of three “global cities,” outlining the city’s connections to the 
global economy and examining the resulting development practices in the mid- and late-
twentieth century. Similarly, authors like Sharon Zukin (2009), Kim Moody (2007), and Richard 
Florida (2017) outline broader development trends that have shaped New York City throughout 
its history all the way up to the present day. While Florida’s work is more general in focus, Zukin 
and Moody take a more narrow view, isolating these trends and their effects on New York in 
particular. More specifically, Julian Brash (2011) examines the twenty-first century real estate 
and urban planning practices under Mayor Bloomberg that provided the platform for the city’s 
contemporary urban landscape. 
 In a similar vein, Scott Larson (2013) looks at planning practices in New York City. 
However, his work also includes a focus on how these practices relate to the vision and legacy of 
Robert Moses and his most famous opponent, Jane Jacobs. Subsequently, Larson’s book provides 
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a literary platform for a reexamination of Moses’s legacy in light of modern New York, 
particularly in terms of real estate development. A few years before Larson, however, Hilary 
Botein and Kenneth T. Jackson (2007) compiled a series of essays that look at Moses’s enduring 
impact on the city, with photos and accounts that detail the state of his projects in the twenty-first 
century. Combined, these two works provide a basis for reconsidering the legacy of Robert 
Moses. Both of these books paint Moses in a more positive light relative to his extremely 
negative legacy throughout the final decades of the twentieth century and indeed over the first 
years of the twenty-first century as well.  
 The aim of this paper is similar in that it will attempt to recognize the positive impact 
Moses has had on the city. As urban development projects have become larger in scale driven by 
public-private partnerships, it seems that a Moses-like era of development has once again 
dawned in New York City. The growing importance of real estate and urban renewal practices 
such as gentrification and mega-projects suggest that Moses’s vision still has a large influence on  
development in New York. Consequently, the main purpose of this essay is to argue for a 
reexamination of his legacy as a figure in the history of New York. Additionally, this paper 
contends that the end result of this analysis points to a more positive legacy for Robert Moses. 
Although Moses’s legacy is subject to change in the future just as it has in light of the modern 
city, at this moment in time it is necessary to renew recognition for his visionary career and 
positive impact on New York City. 
 In order to provide a comprehensive understanding of Moses’s legacy and his impact on 
New York City, this paper will outline a history of New York’s development before, during, and 
after the Moses years. The first chapter will establish this historical framework, first examining 
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the city’s development in the years before Moses came to power, dating all the way back to the 
early nineteenth century. Moving along the historical timeline, this chapter will also examine the 
forty-four years of Moses’s career. Subsequently, the first chapter will also examine Moses’s fall 
from power and his tarnished legacy at the end of his career. In doing so, the first chapter will 
establish a comprehensive historical picture of both how and why Moses came to power and fell 
from grace so precipitously. 
 Chapter Two will continue this historical analysis. However, this chapter primarily looks 
at the years following Moses’s career, primarily in terms of development practices in New York. 
The chapter includes a historical examination of the development trends in the city after Moses 
left office, considering suburban flight and gentrification as major forces that completely altered 
the landscape of the city and thus were instrumental in shaping development. More specifically, 
the chapter will look at the development practices during the Bloomberg years at the start of the 
twenty-first century, when real estate really started to become the main driver of the city 
economy, altering the physical as well as economic landscape of New York. This chapter will 
include two case studies in the form of Hudson Yards and Long Island City to examine twenty-
first century real estate development patterns in the city, as mega-projects have made a comeback 
over thirty years on from Moses’s demise. Finally, the chapter will seek to reconcile these larger 
development trends as well as the two case studies in the context of Moses’s legacy and impact 
on New York. This reconciliation will be central to a clear picture of a reexamined legacy for 
Robert Moses.  
 Chapter Three, however, will conclude the paper with a look to the development of New 
York City in the future and how this development could further shift the tide of opinion 
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regarding Robert Moses. The continued urban expansion and gentrification of the city, 
particularly in the outer boroughs, along with the growing threat of climate change, poses new 
challenges for Moses’s legacy. The chapter will consider how the future of New York City could 
warrant a revisiting of this legacy further down the line, particularly in terms of Moses’s attitude 
and work with mass transit during his career in relation to the threat of climate change and the 
city’s efforts to adapt. While this paper’s central argument is that Moses work and vision should 
be viewed more positively in light of present-day New York, this chapter suggests that this 
legacy could shift again in the future in light of climate change.  
 The paper will conclude with a summary of the main arguments. Moreover, it will seek to 
suggest the areas for further research in this subject, primarily in terms of the relationship 
between Moses’s career, mass transit, and climate change. As climate change threatens many of 
the waterfront and coastal areas throughout the city, areas which have been central to modern 
development practices, it remains to be seen what will the city will do to adapt to this threat. As 
such, this paper will conclude with the point that Moses’s legacy remains up in the air as the city 
moves towards a new period in its development. 
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Chapter One: The Early Development of New York and the Era of Robert Moses 
 Though there may be some bigger and more spectacular cities in the world today, New 
York City stands alone in many ways. Many of the differences between New York and other 
leading cities owe to the career and work of Robert Moses. However, New York City existed 
long before Robert Moses came to power in the early twentieth century; Dutch settlers arrived on 
Manhattan Island in the early seventeenth century, discovering a relatively unoccupied area of 
land with numerous advantages for trade. In the years since, New York has undergone several 
periods in terms of its development. This chapter will look at these stages beginning with the 
early years of New York and continuing through the career of Robert Moses. By examining these 
different stages, this chapter aims to provide clear historical picture of how Robert Moses 
changed New York City as well as how his legacy shifted towards the end of his career. 
 Over three hundred years before Robert Moses came to power, New York City occupied 
only the area now known as Lower Manhattan. Beyond the area of Wall Street, large expanses of 
forests and farmland encompassed the entirety of Manhattan Island. At the time of its founding in 
1624, it would have been near impossible to envision a Manhattan filled with buildings and the 
sprawling, five-borough metropolis that Moses shaped via his bridges and parkways. Thomas 
Bender argues that the geography of the city somewhat predetermined this path, at least in terms 
of Manhattan. Bender writes that, “The narrative of Manhattan’s development has been shaped 
by geography. The long, narrow island directed growth north; farms were relentlessly replaced 
by houses and businesses.”  This residential and commercial growth represents the first stage of 1
development in New York City. 
 Bender, Thomas. The Unfinished City: New York and the Metropolitan Idea. (New York: Univ. Press, 2007), 3.1
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 However, this stage of development lasted over 200 years as it was not truly until the 
beginning of the nineteenth century when it began to take shape. The driving force behind the 
first real development in New York City was the famous grid plan of 1811. In this plan, a group 
of city commissioners envisioned a Manhattan filled with over two thousand rectangular blocks, 
stretching northward all the way to 155th street. Although the degree of northward expansion 
invited ridicule from many, these men envisioned a future for the city’s development that was 
eventually realized following the construction of the Eerie Canal.  The canal made New York’s 2
deep-water port—its main trade advantage—a gate to a long waterway that extended up through 
New York State to Lake Eerie, cementing the city as the leading trading port in the New World.  
 Moreover, the Eerie Canal facilitated the northward expansion of New York City from 
Lower Manhattan, as the area became increasingly busy and industry began to take up more 
space. Gradually, this industry began to transform the landscape of the city, transforming the land 
uses of entire streets. Bender notes that near the end of the 1820s, Wall Street became the first 
street in New York to fall before commerce, which had rendered the street unsuitable for 
residence.  The conversion of Wall Street was the first sign of New York undergoing the process 3
of becoming a center of industry, one which separated work and residence and sorted 
neighborhoods out by class.  As the Industrial Revolution progressed, this process would only 4
intensify. 
 Bender, The Unfinished City, 5.2
 Bender, The Unfinished City, 7.3
 Moody, Kim. From Welfare State to Real Estate: Regime Change in New York City, 1974 to the Present. (New 4
York: New Press 2007), 2.
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 The transformation of New York City into an industrial center had stark consequences for 
residential life. The new trade industries brought with them a myriad of low-paying jobs, and as 
a result working-class people and immigrants increasingly flocked to the city to find 
employment. The problem, however, lay in the need for housing these immigrants and low-wage 
workers. Tenements began to emerge in great numbers, particularly on the Lower East Side as 
Bleecker Street declined after 1850, creating a pattern of residence that would house New York’s 
working poor for over a century until Robert Moses and his bulldozers arrived.  Past the 5
midpoint of the nineteenth century, New York had cemented its status as an industrial city and 
increasingly began to attract migrants from all over the world who formed the low-wage 
workforce that populated these tenements.  
 The final three decades of the nineteenth century saw further transformation of New York 
City’s landscape, changes which would forever alter the city’s development. The aforementioned 
migration meant that by 1910, the population of Manhattan alone reached 2,300,000, one and a 
half times its population as of 1870.  Most significant, however, was the incorporation of Greater 6
New York in 1898. New York’s geography changed dramatically as Manhattan and the Bronx 
united with Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island to form the modern City of New York, 
expanding the city’s industry as well as its physical size and its population, which for the city as 
a whole reached almost 5,000,000 by 1910.  The incorporation of these three boroughs into New 7
York City at the turn of the century was instrumental in shaping the development that was to 
come as the twentieth century began. 
 Bender, The Unfinished City, 10.5
 Moody, From Welfare State to Real Estate, 2.6
 Moody, From Welfare State to Real Estate, 3.7
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 In fact, it could be argued that 1898 marked the end of the first stage of New York’s 
development and ushered in a new period, one in which Robert Moses came to power and 
drastically altered the city’s landscape. However, it is essential to examine the city’s development 
in the twentieth century prior to the Moses era. Bender points out that by the turn of the century, 
much of the undeveloped land in Manhattan had largely filled up with primarily residential 
development, reaching to the island’s horizontal limits.  Coupled with the incorporation of the 8
outer boroughs, this development resulted in a need for expansion beyond these horizontal limits. 
By the turn of the century, railroads and bridges extended to the outer boroughs via an arterial 
traffic flow, which was accepted as the starting point for urban planning in New York.  Indeed, 9
the idea of an arterial traffic flow that connected Manhattan with the rest of the boroughs was 
central to the planning practices of Robert Moses, the city’s most important urban planner. 
 However, Moses did not truly arrive on the scene as a planner for over two decades, and 
thus there were larger forces at play which shaped the city’s development at the start of the 
twentieth century. The emergence of the skyscraper and the city’s skyline coincided with the 
incorporation of Greater New York in 1898, as the metropolitan region became increasingly 
connected and the metropolis grew upward and outward.  However, these increased connections 10
did not breed hope for the outer boroughs to rival Lower Manhattan as the city’s commercial 
center. For example, although Brooklyn was comparable to Manhattan in both size and 
population, it didn’t envision passing it as a commercial center, but rather hoped to be part of a 
metropolis. Similarly, the real estate interests behind the Brooklyn Bridge project hoped for 
 Bender, The Unfinished City, 20.8
 Bender, The Unfinished City, 23.9
 Bender, The Unfinished City, 83.10
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residential growth rather than commercial growth in the borough.  Consequently, Manhattan 11
further cemented its place as the city’s business center. 
 With Manhattan’s status as the center of the city confirmed despite the incorporation of 
Greater New York, the emphasis of urban planning in the city at the outset of the twentieth 
century was overwhelmingly skewed towards the city center. This trend culminated in New 
York’s first Regional Plan, whose planners placed a great emphasis on Manhattan: 
“The transformation of Manhattan into a financial/administrative center at the cost of 
manufacturing was a central hope of the regional planners. The plan ranked central city land uses 
in terms of rents, giving priority thereby to office buildings, luxury housing, and luxury retail 
stores. The planners sought, on the other hand, to eliminate or decentralize less lucrative land 
uses, such as loft manufacturing, middle- and lower-class housing, and ordinary retail 
shopping.”  12
The plan was the first comprehensive urban plan developed in New York City, and thus it would 
have numerous consequences for the city’s development in the following years. Unsurprisingly, a 
main result of the plan was that Manhattan only grew as a commercial hub, as new, taller office 
and luxury residential buildings began to reshape the skyline. To be sure, the group behind the 
first Regional Plan had achieved their goals. 
 During the seven years it took for the Regional Plan to progress from inception to 
completion in 1929, the man who would become New York’s most important planner was 
making his mark further out from the city, on Long Island. The election of Al Smith as Governor 
of New York in 1922 gave an ambitious young reformer named Robert Moses a friend in politics 
that he could use to implement a few of the many ideas that had been mulling in his mind for 
over a decade since he first entered public service after graduating from Yale.  Although Moses 13
 Bender, The Unfinished City, 22.11
 Bender, The Unfinished City, 26.12
 Caro, Robert. The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York. (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), 139.13
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insisted there was nothing he wanted for the first two years of his service under Smith, one day 
he finally told the Governor that what he wanted was parks.  Though Smith had no way of 14
knowing it, Moses would eventually use these parks to gain unprecedented power in New York. 
 Coupled with the large growth in population in New York from 1910 to 1920, the lack of 
parks in the city meant that it became increasingly overcrowded. In that decade, the population 
of New York grew by almost 1,000,000, mostly outside of Manhattan, with red-brick buildings 
replacing the vacant meadows, farmlands, and large swaths of land that were essential for 
parks.  Brooklyn and Queens were cramped with 2,500,000 people, beyond which on Long 15
Island lived only 250,000 people, with one person to every four acres and thus a bevy of open 
space that was becoming increasingly scarce in the city.  Moreover, a larger trend was gripping 16
America: the number of automobile-owning families in the country grew from 7,000,000 to 
23,000,000 in just four years from 1919 to 1923, finally making the countryside accessible to the 
urban masses of America.  Moses was seemingly aware of all of these factors, and thus he set 17
out to implement his ideas for great state parks that were easily accessible to the automobile-
owning masses of New York City. 
 The story of Jones Beach State Park, Moses’ first and perhaps most famous public work, 
reveals a great deal about his vision and his approach. In 1923, the only public beach on the 
South Shore of Long Island was the expensive Long Beach, and thus New Yorkers desiring a 
swim who couldn’t afford these prices continuously drove along the shore from village to village 
 Caro, The Power Broker, 142.14
 Caro, The Power Broker, 143.15
 Caro, The Power Broker, 145.16
 Caro, The Power Broker, 144. 17
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until they reached the empty potato fields of Suffolk County, well over fifty miles from the city.  18
Moses recognized this problem and envisioned a public park on a beach closer to the city. 
However, Moses biographer Robert Caro notes that “The South Shore, the edge of the meadow 
that had been transformed into the Great South Bay, offered gentle waves and sandy beaches. But 
the bay was the haunt of the baymen, a closemouthed, independent breed.”  It was these baymen 19
that formed the first major opposition group against Robert Moses. As will become evident, 
however, even the most ardent opposition was not enough to deter Moses from his vision. 
 Despite opposition from the baymen, Moses set about planning his state park on the 
beaches of the South Shore, finding a particular site on Jones Beach that possessed both the size 
and the location that his vision required. The five tracts of woods that lined this beach totaled 
3,500 acres—3,500 acres of unused land sitting only eleven miles from the city line, and within 
thirty miles from Manhattan.  Moses had found his state park site; however, getting the masses 20
of New York City out to it presented another problem. After many nights studying maps of Long 
Island, he suddenly noticed that a straight line could be drawn through the water supply 
properties off Merrick Road; therefore, a road could also be built along that straight line without 
having to purchase or condemn a substantial amount of land for the right-of-way.  This road 21
would come to represent the first building block in the vast parkway network that Moses would 
build in Long Island and around New York City. 
 Caro, The Power Broker, 155.18
 Caro, The Power Broker, 147.19
 Caro, The Power Broker, 159.20
 Caro, The Power Broker, 161.21
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 Moses’ work on his parks and this parkway network as well as a connected network of 
bridges and roads dominated the first two decades of his career. The sheer size of this network 
reflects the scope of Moses’ vision for New York—the fact that these roads and bridges only 
formed the first half of this vision and of his career in turn reflect the expansive nature of Moses’ 
work. In the introduction to his book, Robert Caro notes that Moses built 416 miles of parkways 
throughout his career, stretching out from the center of the city in long ribbons of concrete closed 
to commercial traffic and bordered by lawns and trees.  Moreover, by the end of his career 22
Moses had increased the acreage of state parks in New York State by over 3,000,000, giving the 
state 45 percent of the entire combined acreage of state parks throughout the country.  The 23
numbers speak for themselves—Robert Moses built more roads and parks than any other man in 
American history during his career. 
 However, this career did not truly take off until the eve of the 1930s, as the completion of 
Jones Beach in the summer of 1929 represented a turning point in Moses’ career. During the 
1920s, Moses had overwhelmingly focused his work on Long Island and in areas outside New 
York City; by the end of 1926, the beaches of Long Island that were previously reserved for the 
rich were dotted with wooden bathhouses open to the masses.  Also in that year, however, 24
Moses began to turn his focus toward New York City when it became apparent that city officials 
were stalling on building a road network that could serve the Long Island parkways he had 
 Caro, The Power Broker, 8.22
 Caro, The Power Broker, 10.23
 Caro, The Power Broker, 220.24
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already built.  Despite the fame of Jones Beach and the scope of Moses’ work on Long Island, 25
his New York City projects beginning in the 1930s would come to define his career. 
 Moses’ work on Long Island in the 1920s had given him his first taste of fame and power, 
a taste which would grow insatiably for the remainder of his career. After a fourteen-year period 
in which the number of automobiles in New York City grew by over 650,000 while the 
government failed to build a single mile of arterial highway, the city was strangling on its traffic 
by 1932.  Of course, also during this time, Robert Moses rose through the ranks of public 26
service in New York, and by 1934 he was in charge of the seven separate government agencies 
concerned with parks and major roads in the New York metropolitan area.  With such 27
unprecedented power, coupled with his rising reputation, Moses was largely able to build what 
he wanted where he wanted it throughout the 1930s, perhaps the most prolific period of his 
career 
 Of course, his power and reputation only went so far when it came to actually completing 
projects; Moses needed enormous amounts of public money if he wanted to see his vision 
through. Whether he was aware of it or not, Moses’ longtime adversary President Roosevelt laid 
the foundation for Moses to impose his vision on New York City by implementing the New Deal 
in 1933. The new federal program granted Moses access to an unprecedented amount of public 
money which he used to complete his network of bridges and parkways and thereby connect 
 Caro, The Power Broker, 339.25
 Caro, The Power Broker, 329.26
 Caro, The Power Broker, 362. 27
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Manhattan and Long Island to Westchester, the Bronx, and the mainland of the United States.  28
By May of 1934, only a few months after Governor Lehman appointed him as the first Park 
Commissioner in New York history, Moses had completed 1700 of his 1800 promised park 
renovations in New York.  However, these were merely improvements on parks that already 29
existed—parks that by themselves were insufficient to handle the increased population, 
particularly in New York City. Moses needed to build new parks in the city itself in order to truly 
solve this problem, and money was not enough to do so; for this, Moses required land—the 
supply of which was rapidly dwindling, in turn driving up the price. 
 However, Moses—as he almost always did throughout his career—came up with 
ingenious solutions for obtaining the land he required. First, he turned his attention to land 
already owned by a city department, ordering personal inspections of every parcel to determine if 
they were being used properly and finding hundreds of acres that were idle in terms of 
development.  Having learned over a decade before about “unappropriated state lands,” Moses 30
sent men to Albany to look up these parcels, where they found several in areas of Brooklyn that 
were now slums. As the city couldn’t afford to buy them and appropriation was not part of the 
New Deal money at Moses’ disposal, he was able to push through bills that simply turned this 
land over to the city government.  By 1935, he had turned most of these parcels into parks and 31
playgrounds for the city’s residents, drawing waves of praise from city newspapers as well as the 
 Gutman, Marta. “Equipping the Public Realm: Rethinking Robert Moses and Recreation.” In Robert Moses and 28
the Modern City: The Transformation of New York, ed. Hilary Ballon and Kenneth T. Jackson. (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2007), 87.
 Caro, The Power Broker, 372.29
 Caro, The Power Broker, 375.30
 Caro, The Power Broker, 376.31
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public.  All told, by the end of the 1930s Moses had built 255 new playgrounds in New York 32
City.  Moses had solved not only the issue of a lack of parks in New York City but also the 33
problem of a scarcity of land on which to build them. 
 Moreover, Moses gave the city residents who did not own cars access to open-air 
swimming by building public pools in many of these parks. These enormous pools turned 
swimming into a grand public spectacle, with the largest pools allowing thousands of people to 
swim at one time.  Although residents in certain neighborhoods opposed these large pools, upon 34
their opening in 1936 Moses was universally celebrated for putting the needs of the city’s 
ordinary people first through spectacular public architecture and recreation.  Consequently, by 35
the mid-1930s, there was no denying that the city’s first Park Commissioner had made his mark. 
 At the same time as he was building hundreds of parks and pools, however, Moses was 
masterminding two of his most ambitious projects that would make a bigger, more permanent 
mark on New York City. These were the Triborough Bridge and the so-called “West Side 
Improvement.” The former was a project of heroic proportions, a bridge network that would 
enable residents of northern Manhattan to reach Queens simply by traveling crosstown and over 
the bridge; one that would enable residents of the Bronx, Westchester, and New Jersey to reach 
Long Island without ever even sniffing Midtown Manhattan.  The cost of this bridge complex 36
was staggering; the amount promised for its construction as of 1934 was close to the combined 
 Caro, The Power Broker, 378-379.32
 Caro, The Power Broker, 255.33
 Gutman, “Equipping the Public Realm,” 80.34
 Gutman, “Equipping the Public Realm,” 81.35
 Caro, The Power Broker, 388.36
!17
cost of the numerous projects Moses had built on Long Island during the previous decade.  By 37
almost any measure, the Triborough Bridge was the biggest undertaking of Robert Moses’ career 
to date. 
 That was, however, until Moses began to develop plans for the West Side Improvement. 
Robert Caro’s description clearly illustrates the enormity of the project: 
 “[It] included not only the completion of the long-stalled, five-mile elevated express highway 
from the southern tip of Manhattan Island to Seventy-second Street; but also the design and 
construction of the extension of that highway six and a half miles north to the northern tip of 
Manhattan Island; the transformation of six and a half miles of muddy wasteland into a park that 
would make beautiful the city’s western waterfront; the throwing of a ‘Henry Hudson Bridge’ 
across the Harlem River that separated Manhattan from the Bronx; the continuation of the 
highway through the Bronx to the city line and, beyond the line, to the Saw Mill River Parkway, 
so that the city would have at last a true outlet to the north.” (525-526) 
I quote extensively here simply because there is no better way to display the sheer size of the 
West Side Improvement. The plan provided an uninterrupted road network from the city’s 
business center in Lower Manhattan not only to the Bronx, but also well beyond the city line to 
Westchester and New England. It required adding 132 acres of land to Manhattan Island as well 
as a staggering sum of public money that would reach at least $180,000,000 and likely close to 
$218,000,000.  Caro notes that Robert Moses himself was the man who arranged the vast 38
majority of this financing: “The catalyst that brought the West Side Improvement to fruition 
wasn’t Washington’s largesse but Moses’ genius for turning a dream into a reality, for 
accomplishment, for Getting It Done.”  When the last link in the West Side Improvement was 39
completed in in 1937, Moses had executed a project which forever transformed New York City’s 
Hudson River waterfront. 
 Caro, The Power Broker, 387.37
 Caro, The Power Broker, 556-557.38
 Caro, The Power Broker, 540.39
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 By the end of the 1930s, Moses had not only reshaped New York City with his parks but 
also with the two largest and perhaps most significant infrastructure projects of his career. By the 
end of the decade, there were more miles of highway at grade in the New York metropolitan area 
than in the next five largest American cities combined.  In the span of just over a decade, Moses 40
had completely revamped the road network on Long Island and in New York City as well. But he 
was nowhere near done. Having already transformed Manhattan’s shoreline through the West 
Side Improvement, he still wanted to transform the shorelines of Brooklyn and Staten Island by 
building parkways, a vision that would eventually be realized.  Caro notes that, beginning in the 41
early 1940s, Moses destroyed the New York City Tunnel Authority, ensuring that for the 
remaining twenty-five years of his career no motorist would be able to use a modern bridge or 
tunnel without paying his authorities tribute.  Thus, Moses in the 1940s possessed huge reserves 42
of both power and money with which he could complete his vision for a connected network of 
bridges, highways, parkways, and tunnels in the New York City metropolitan area. 
 As he did throughout his career, Robert Moses did not waste the opportunity these 
endowments presented. By 1945, Moses was planning more miles of superhighways in New 
York City than in all other cities of the world combined.  Caro notes that these roads were like 43
no other roads in the history of the world, as “these were roads through a city.”  Even for the 44
sections of these superhighways that traversed through relatively unoccupied areas of the city, 
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there were always apartment houses, private homes, and factories that blocked their paths; for the 
vast majority of these roads, Moses had to hack his way through these brick-and-mortar 
jungles.  Nonetheless, these physical obstacles seemingly did nothing to deter his plans or his 45
vision, likely due to the state of his reputation at the time as well as the amount of power and 
money he had at his disposal. 
 While Moses was beginning to put these highway plans in motion, urban renewal was 
gaining influence in the United States—particularly following the conclusion of World War II. 
Caro writes that, “Before the war—during the entire Depression—the federal government had 
financed a total of 200,000 low-income apartments. Within the first four years after the war, the 
federal government authorized the financing of 810,000 low-income apartments.”  The passing 46
of the Title I Housing Act in 1949 followed this stage and ushered in a period of unprecedented 
public spending on urban renewal projects as federal subsidies became available to private real 
estate developers in return for building low-income urban housing.  Robert Moses would take 47
advantage of this program more than any other public figure, drawing on this new source of 
funds to establish public-private partnerships which in turn reshaped much of New York City’s 
built environment. 
 Even before Title I was officially passed, however, Moses had begun consolidating power 
in the realm of urban renewal. Moses persuaded Mayor William O’Dwyer to appoint him 
chairman of the Mayor’s Slum Clearance Committee, and this post gave him absolute control 
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over urban renewal in New York, which was by far the largest program in America.  This 48
program allowed Moses to partner with bankers, who essentially ran the Housing Authority for 
him by selecting who got the construction contracts for his projects, while he determined where 
and when these projects would be built.  This public-private relationship that now seems 49
commonplace in the modern day was central to Moses’ urban renewal work. However, it was this 
work—combined with his highway projects of the 1940s—that would eventually cast the first 
rays of negative light on Robert Moses, a light which would only continue to grow brighter until 
he finally fell from power in the 1960s.  
 It was likely the manner in which Moses went about implementing his urban renewal and 
highway ideas that made not only the media but the public begin to question his methods.  Moses 
became notorious for bulldozing entire neighborhoods that the city government had designated 
as “slums” in order to replace them with new buildings or to build his new superhighways, all the 
while proclaiming that you “cannot make an omelet without breaking a few eggs” as a way to 
justify his destruction of the built environment.  However, this justification was not enough in 50
the eyes of an increasing number of Moses’ critics. Moreover, Moses’ urban renewal programs 
were overwhelmingly affecting black and Puerto Rican residents, a population that was not able 
to find other homes due to their poverty as well as racial discrimination.  Consequently, some 51
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people began to notice how Moses’ bulldozers were cementing divisions of race and class in 
New York City, and they began to challenge the positive perception of his work.  
 Among this group of people were the editors of the New York newspapers, once the 
bedrock for Robert Moses’ glowing reputation and positive public perception. For the first time, 
Robert Moses became associated with scandal through his Title I projects. One example was in 
the fight for a parking lot at Tavern-on-the-Green in Central Park; it was this battle that signified 
the end of the thirty-year Moses Boom in public opinion, as outrage over the project amongst the 
press was echoed by the public.  Caro argues that the Manhattantown slum clearance project 52
was perhaps the most impactful scandal of his career: “Not only had Robert Moses’ committee 
approved an associate of racketeers as a slum clearance sponsor, it had done so although Moses’ 
key colleague on the committee had known he was an associate of racketeers.”  Whether or not 53
Moses knew this himself is missing the point; reporters had uncovered that this man who 
supposedly scorned politicians was in charge of a program that allowed not only racketeers but 
the top echelon of New York’s politicians to gain enormous profits.  These reporters had 54
destroyed the legend of Robert Moses as public servant who worked for the people and against 
the politicians. 
 In keeping with his behavior throughout his entire career, however, Moses did attempt to 
fight back against the rising tide of negative attention in the press. Of course, this was a battle in 
which Moses’ status as a public official left him doomed from the start, with the press itself 
representing the battleground and therefore possessing the ability to dictate the public portrayal 
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of Moses’ attacks.  Moreover, the most effective way for the press to combat Moses’ attacks and 55
justify their negative stories on him was to dig even deeper, giving them a vested interest in 
destroying his image when once they had a significant interest in preserving it.  Unsurprisingly, 56
the press’ coverage of Moses and his projects turned increasingly negative, and with it the tide of 
public opinion—the key to Moses’ power—ebbed as well.  
 A prominent but perhaps lesser-known critic who reflects this change in public opinion 
was urban activist Charles Abrams, who challenged Moses’ ideas on urban renewal. With Moses 
having successfully brokered the clearance and redevelopment of Stuyvesant Town and with the 
full force of federal endorsement behind him in the from of public money, he was ready to 
expand the scope of his urban renewal projects.  Abrams’ ideas on urban renewal and slum 57
clearances were antithetical to those of Moses, and thus he started becoming an outspoken critic 
of the so-called “master-builder.” Paul Walker argues that while Moses embodied abstract 
solutions to poverty via the idea that bureaucratic categorization of housing structures would 
improve the lives of individuals in a certain slum, Abrams considered the built environment an 
insurmountable obstacle for this individual autonomy, and thus argued for a less visible 
approach.  This clear chasm in opinion manifested itself in Abrams’ outright public opposition 58
towards Moses. 
 Within the rhetoric of this opposition lie numerous examples of the ideas that would 
come to dominate public opinion, in turn greatly altering the public attitude towards Robert 
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Moses. Abrams noted several problems with slum clearance, noting that often it merely moved 
people to slums on less valuable land, with only the developers of the new building benefitting 
from non-poor tenants and increased rents.  Moreover, Abrams pointed out that even if the 59
developers allowed a slum dweller into the new, subsidized building, the increased rent-to-
income ratio would leave a family worse off than before.  However, Abrams’ lack of power and 60
institutional authority meant that his discourse remained marginal, not only in terms of the 
political and economic interests of city leaders but also in the realm of policy.  Other critics, 61
however, possessed similar ideas yet more influence than Abrams, and they would use these 
ideas to challenge Robert Moses more effectively.  
 The most famous of these critics is the author Jane Jacobs, a woman whose writings and 
direct opposition to Moses have cemented her name in the history of great urban thinkers. 
Jacobs’ texts argued for a different way of thinking about planning and governing cities that was 
antithetical to Moses’ focus on getting things done, using his projects as his “text.”  Similar to 62
Charles Abrams, Jacobs advocated for dense, walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods and was 
skeptical of the positive impact Moses attributed to parks, which she argued could add to a 
neighborhood’s “dullness, danger, and emptiness.”  In short, “Moses was an avatar of the early 63
20th-century vision that the only salvation of cities was the large-scale destruction of their 
existing features, and Jacobs the exemplar of another, which maintained that the future of cities 
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reseted on preserving exactly those qualities.”  It is from these two opposing positions in the 64
arena of urban theory where Robert Moses and Jane Jacobs began their struggle with one 
another, a struggle that would come to define their legacies.  
 However, despite their starkly disparate views and ideas, Moses and Jane Jacobs didn’t 
truly come into direct conflict with one another until the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was at this 
time when Moses was working on the most controversial project of his career: 
“The Lower Manhattan Expressway was an effort to tie up the loose ends of local roadways by 
extending Interstate 78 – all 10 lanes of it – from the Holland Tunnel to the Manhattan and 
Williamsburg Bridges. The obstacle was the streetscape of SoHo and Little Italy, and the great variety 
of uses within that the city found dispensable.”  65
This was not the first time Moses had proposed a superhighway that would ram straight through 
the city’s built environment; in 1960—the same year the city approved his plans for the Lower 
Manhattan Expressway—Moses had completed a one-mile stretch of the Cross-Bronx 
Expressway that smashed through the immigrant neighborhood of East Tremont in the Bronx, 
razing apartment buildings and displacing hundreds of residents.  While this project hardly 66
received any attention in the media and in the eyes of the public, the Lower Manhattan 
Expressway proposed demolishing not an immigrant enclave in the Bronx but a historic center of 
New York City. It is no wonder the project caused perhaps the most public fight of Robert 
Moses’ career, one that remains central not only to his legacy but the legacy of Jane Jacobs as 
well.  
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 However, it was not Moses alone with whom Jacobs was fighting. The Housing and 
Redevelopment Board was conducting a study that intended to classify a large area of Greenwich 
Village as “blighted,” opening it up to large-scale redevelopment and prompting Jacobs to 
revamp her efforts to halt the flattening of her neighborhood as co-chair of a Committee to Save 
the West Village.  The expressway had support from the city, the Regional Plan Association, and 67
business groups as well as construction workers’ associations—yet the efforts of this committee 
forced Mayor Robert Wagner to halt the condemnation proceedings in 1962, only to announce 
renewed support for a slightly altered plan in 1965.  Nonetheless, thanks to the efforts of Jacobs 68
and the diverse local coalition that she established, public opinion prevailed and Mayor John 
Linsday declared the project scrapped in 1968.  The defeat was the most high-profile and 69
damaging of Moses’ long career; more importantly, it was the final sign that after over forty 
years, Robert Moses had lost power.  
 However, Moses had already begun to lose his power at the end of the 1950s and the 
beginning of the 1960s. With his reputation in the eyes of the public smeared by the Title I 
scandals and many city newspapers calling for the mayor to cut his power, Moses knew that 
funding for his urban renewal projects would likely be cut as well. As a result, he accepted a 
position as the President for the 1964-1965 New York World’s Fair in 1959, leaving his post as 
Chairman of the Mayor’s Committee on Slum Clearance.  However, Caro notes that at this time 70
Moses still controlled one city authority and three state authorities; he had anchored himself in a 
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position that was so secure that only he himself could truly take his power away.  Nonetheless, 71
as Moses began to age well past the retirement limit for public officials, Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller continually granted him only one-year extensions until Moses threatened to resign 
all of his state posts—a resignation which Rockefeller, unlike all Governors before him, 
accepted.  In doing so, Rockefeller stripped Moses of his power as Park Commissioner as well 72
as his public authority money; in essence, Rockefeller had fired Robert Moses.  While many 73
other Governors had dreaded doing exactly what Rockefeller had done, public opinion on Moses 
had shifted so drastically that this act drew none of the consequences previous Governors feared.  
 The World’s Fair, therefore, represented an opportunity for a saving grace for Robert 
Moses. Not only could the Fair help rehabilitate his reputation in the eyes of New Yorkers and 
the New York press, the national coverage of the event could provide fame across the country 
and across the globe as well.  Moreover, the site of the Fair—Flushing Meadows—had occupied 74
Moses’ imagination for decades in dreams for a great park there at the geographical center of 
New York City, a truly “Central” Park for the city’s population as it steadily began to move 
eastward.  The dream for Flushing and a corridor with three other parks along it was the key 75
attraction to the Fair presidency for Moses.  Although he had lost the power of his state 76
authorities as well as his power as Park Commissioner, the Fair represented a chance to gain 
some power back and improve his image in the eyes of the public. 
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 Unfortunately for Moses, the Fair would only harm him in terms of his power and his 
reputation. Though it should in theory have rehabilitated this reputation and even expanded it, 
the Fair ultimately destroyed it.  There are many explanations for why the Fair failed, but in 77
reality the manner in which Robert Moses ran it was the driving force behind its lack of success. 
Moses, with park dreams in his head, ordered the temporary exhibition structures to be built to 
the cheapest possible specifications, given that they would only stand for two years.  The result 78
was a hodgepodge of two hundred pavilions varying in size and shape, a lack of a theme and 
sense of unity that was perhaps the Fair’s greatest weakness.  Moreover, despite Moses knowing 79
that for the Fair to be successful he would need the help of the press in order to promote it to the 
public, once he was in the same room he could not hide his contempt for the people who had 
ruined his reputation and reverted to his customary verbal attacks.  The press responded to 80
Moses by looking into his claims regarding who would be sponsoring exhibits at the Fair, finding 
many that he lied about or others that had pulled out, further damaging his image.  Of course, by 81
damaging the image of Moses, the President of the Fair, the press would likely damage its 
success as well. 
 The degree to which the Fair was unsuccessful was staggering nonetheless. In order to 
recoup its expenses, the Fair had to avenge 220,000 visitors per day, yet attendance on the 
opening day was 49,642; while there were crowds of 170,000 each day during the first weekend, 
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attendance averaged only around 45,000 during the following week.  Consequently, the money 82
earned by the Fair was not only not enough to make the profits Moses had predicted but it even 
fell well short of the amount required for the Fair to pay its bills. Moses had already spent 
$30,000,000 before opening day and around $30,000,000 more by the end of the summer of 
1964; he expected the fair to earn $90,000,000 during that period, but in reality it perhaps earned 
$35,000,000.  Though reporters had for months been reporting these financial difficulties, 83
Moses continually attacked them; by January of 1965, however, the truth was out to the public.  84
The Fair was a spectacular failure, and along with it fell Robert Moses and the remaining pieces 
reputation.  
 Three years later, the empire of Robert Moses finally fell. In 1966, Mayor John Lindsay 
had introduced a bill that would merge the Triborough with the Transit Authority, creating a 
centralized transportation authority and making the surpluses of the two authorities available for 
subway operation.  Though Lindsay’s bill was not able to pass without Moses’ approval due to 85
covenants in the bonds held by the Triborough and Transit authorities which required them to 
remain autonomous entities, the Mayor promised Moses that he would remain in power, a 
promise which he would end up breaking.  With the merger, “the age of Robert Moses was over. 86
Begun on April 23, 1924, it had ended on March 1, 1968. After forty-four years of power, the 
power was gone at last.”  Disappearing along with this power was the greatest builder New 87
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York and perhaps the world had ever known, a man who had imposed his will on the city and 
forever altered its landscape. 
 And yet, in the years following Robert Moses’ fall from power, his legacy and the public 
perception of his work turned increasingly negative. Mayor Lindsay would consistently use his 
name in speeches in order to promote new policies and initiatives he saw as antithetical to 
Moses’ ideas and vision.  Indeed, the man who for decades was all over the newspapers was 88
only mentioned in these same papers in a derogatory context, as a man who was responsible for 
mistakes in highways and housing.  Robert Caro’s biography on Moses ends with perhaps the 89
most pertinent question regarding this negative turn towards the legacy of Robert Moses and his 
impact on New York City:  
“Down in the audience [for Moses’ address at the dedication of the Excedra in Flushing Meadows], 
the ministers of the empire of Moses glanced at one another and nodded their heads. RM was right as 
usual, they whispered. Couldn’t people see what he had done? Why weren’t they grateful?”  90
Robert Moses had built more for New York City than any other public official had built for any 
city ever before, yet the public’s attitude towards him at the end of his career was not only 
ungrateful but even downright scornful. 
 To be sure, this attitude largely persisted long after his career was over, and in turn it has 
tarnished the legacy of Robert Moses for decades. Writing forty years after the publication of his 
book in 1974, Caro himself said that there were ample answers to the question of gratitude that 
concludes his book, noting Moses’ racism and work with mass transit as well as the manner in 
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which his urban renewal project displaced hundreds of thousands of residents.  Indeed, although 91
Caro’s book represents a sort of monument to Moses’ achievements, through it runs a subtle but 
overarching thesis that suggests that Moses destroyed the city, leaving New York in the state of 
desperation that it was in at the time Caro published his book.  By the time Robert Moses died 92
in 1981, he was largely reviled as a figure in New York’s history.  Almost forty years later, this 93
attitude towards Robert Moses and his legacy has largely persisted. 
 Although he made several mistakes throughout his career, Moses’s legacy as a destroyer 
of New York City owes much more to a broader shift in the public attitude towards urban 
planning as a whole. It is here where Jane Jacobs played perhaps her largest role in shaping the 
legacy of Robert Moses. Jacobs published her own seminal work in 1961, arguing against 
modern planning strategies that favored tall towers surrounded by empty parks, wide streets built 
for auto traffic rather than pedestrians, and large-scale new development that destroyed the 
authentic human contacts within a city.  This book raised an alarm against the arrogance of state 94
power, a power personified by Robert Moses.  Many other Moses critics adopted the ideas that 95
Jacobs presented in The Death and Life of Great American Cities, and thus she was instrumental 
in helping shift the tide of public opinion against him destroying his legacy at the end of his 
career. 
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 Consequently, Moses’ defeats in the late 1950s and in the 1960s took on a meaning that 
went beyond his loss of power. Each defeat signaled a triumph of the ideas Jacobs championed 
over the vision and ideas of Robert Moses, with planned development in New York shifting as 
voters changed the approval process for large-scale development projects to require more public 
input following his fall from power.  Indeed, the public viewed Jane Jacobs as the patron saint 96
of the grassroots movement against bureaucratic acts that brought on what she called “the great 
blight of dullness.”  It is evident how such a perception could improve her legacy while 97
simultaneously harming that of Robert Moses, who stood for the opposite of Jacobs’ ideals in the 
form of top-down, large-scale urban planning. When Jacobs died in 2006, twenty-five years after 
Moses passed away with his reputation in tatters, both the press and the public venerated her 
career and ideas.  However, it was more than Jacobs’ ideas that endowed her with such a 98
positive legacy; New York underwent severe changes during the period between Moses’ fall from 
power in the late 1960s and Jacobs’ death in 2006, shifting the perception on both figures.  
 The next chapter of this paper will detail these changes, mainly in terms of suburban 
flight, gentrification, and the large-scale real estate development projects that have made a return 
in the twenty-first century. More specifically, the chapter will examine real estate practices in 
New York City over the decades since Moses left power. In doing so, it will aim to provide 
valuable insight into how changing development trends have affected the legacies of both Robert 
Moses and Jane Jacobs. Moreover, in light of the large-scale redevelopment projects in the 
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Bloomberg Years and the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the next chapter will present the 
bulk of this paper’s main argument for a more positive reconsideration of the legacy and career 
of Robert Moses. 
!33
Chapter Two: Changing Development and a Changing Legacy 
 Fifty-four years after Robert Moses fell from power, New York is almost beyond 
recognition. Over a decade of suburbanization, white flight, and urban decay followed the fall of 
Robert Moses, with the city falling into fiscal crisis in the mid-1970s and continuing to decay 
until the “back-to-the-city” movement began in the 1980s. From the 1990s until the present day, 
gentrification has held a tight grip on New York City, transforming entire neighborhoods and 
ushering in a new era in terms of development patterns, one defined by large-scale 
redevelopment via public-private partnerships. These continued shifts in urban development in 
New York since Moses left power are vital to an understanding of his enduring legacy. This 
chapter will examine these changes in the city’s development; in doing so, it will argue for a 
reexamination of the legacy of Robert Moses and for recognition of the positive impact his 
career has had on New York City. 
 Less than a decade after Governor Rockefeller finally stripped Moses of his last sliver of 
power, New York City was in disarray. A massive wave of industrial exodus occurred in the late 
1960s and 1970s, as bankers and real estate developers began to drive goods-making industries 
further away from the city in order to redevelop the land they occupied for more valuable uses.  99
Along with these industries left thousands of decent-paying jobs—with these jobs went the tax 
revenues of a once-stable working class and the businesses that employed it.  By the 100
mid-1970s, New York was exporting sixty-eight percent of the value it produced to the rest of the 
world as it cemented its central place within the global economy, exacerbating the decline of its 
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industrial base in favor of producer services, finance, and communications.  This economic 101
shift was central to New York City’s decline. 
 With the changes to the city’s economy came changes in its population as well. Suburban 
flight dating all the way back to the 1950s moved affluent whites out of the central city, with a 
large influx of black and Puerto Rican migrants—as well as Asians, South Americans, and 
Carribeans during the 1970s—taking their place.  In 1940, ninety-four percent of New York 102
City was white; by 1985, the population of whites in the city had dwindled to just forty-nine 
percent.  As whites were more likely to be wealthy, particularly relative to the poor immigrants 103
that replaced them, white flight had a profound impact on New York City’s budget as it lost the 
tax revenues from hundreds of thousands of affluent residents. Half a million people left New 
York City in the period from 1970 to 1975, helping to cause a recession that not only halted the 
migration of immigrants but also increased the outflow of these middle- and higher-income white 
residents.  This sharp loss in population was a massive blow to city revenues; New York City 104
was on the brink of collapse by 1975, only seven years after Robert Moses has fallen from 
power.  
 Consequently, it would appear that Moses himself is to blame for New York City’s 
decline. However, ascribing the city’s disarray in the mid-1970s to Moses’ works and career 
overlooks the broader trends that were shaping the country at the time. John Logan and Harvey 
Molotch note that by 1970, suburban residential population in the United States was greater than 
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the population of central cities, with blue-collar workers as well as affluent whites more likely to 
live in the suburbs.  Furthermore, in the period from 1963 to 1977, the country’s twenty-five 105
largest metropolitan areas saw their total employment in manufacturing drop by 700,000 in the 
central cities while it grew by more than 1,100,000 in the suburban area; employment, like 
residence, had therefore become suburban as well.  As a result, it is evident that the same 106
phenomena that brought about New York City’s decline were gripping large cities across the 
country, perhaps absolving Robert Moses from some of the blame for the state of the city in the 
1970s.  
 However, it is also evident that the highways and roads Moses built contributed to New 
York’s decline by encouraging more suburbanization. Logan & Molotch argue that advances in 
transportation such as the automobile and airplanes drew the country’s focus away from the 
downtown area, as freeways and airports gave larger parts of the urban region access to 
transportation.  Of course, Robert Moses built more for the automobile in the form of highways 107
and roads than any other man in American history, connecting large swaths of the New York 
metropolitan region with the city’s central business district more than ever before. Moreover, it is 
likely that Moses’ highways and roads accelerated the movement of corporate headquarters from 
the central city to the surrounding suburbs, where they still had access to the major business 
centers as well as the surrounding transportation infrastructure.  As a result, it seems logical to 108
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ascribe Moses a large portion of the blame for the manner in which his projects drew more and 
more people out of the city.  
 To be sure, Moses’ highways, parkways, and bridges provided easier access to New 
York’s surrounding suburbs, facilitating as well as accelerating the movement of people and 
businesses out of the central city. However, these infrastructure projects were not the main 
driving force behind the city’s decline. As the city continued to lose tax revenues as a result of 
the migration of both people and businesses to the surrounding suburbs, its government decided 
to usher in a prolific period of new office construction in the downtown central business district 
in an attempt to lure them back. This new construction pushed up the price of land and rents in 
the area while the real estate itself was tax-exempt due to government subsidies provided by the 
city.  These subsidies were central to the sharp decrease in the city’s tax revenue as its 109
government increased the proportion of real estate that was tax-exempt to forty percent in the 
mid-1970s.  By 1975, New York City was mired in a fiscal crisis; only a federal loan of 110
$2,300,000,000 prevented the city from defaulting on its short-term debt, which would have 
resulted in massive losses for hundreds of banks across the country.  The decision to subsidize 111
new construction in the downtown area cut the city’s revenues even further; therefore, it is 
evident that a large portion of the responsibility for the fiscal crisis of the 1970s lies with the 
New York City government. 
 If the city government was responsible for the dire state of New York in this decade, 
however, it was also instrumental in reversing the city’s decline during the 1980s and beyond. 
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1978 saw the election of Mayor Ed Koch, who would usher in a new period in New York City’s 
development; in its first four years, the Koch administration increased the city’s developmental 
spending by over fourteen percent.  While this spending increased the market value of the 112
city’s real estate, the Koch administration continued to grant extensive tax breaks to private real 
estate developers; 421a abatements for new residential construction and J-51 abatements for 
condo construction combined to cost over $250,000,000 per year by 1983, while real property 
taxes had declined by nineteen percent since 1975.  While these abatements were detrimental to 113
the city’s budget, they also encouraged gentrification, a process central to new development 
trends that would revitalize New York City.  
 Kim Moody points out the impact of these tax breaks in her discussion of New York City 
after the fiscal crisis of the 1970s. She argues that gentrification was not a natural process 
dictated by artists and hippies seeking affordable housing, but rather the new tax-incentive 
programs in the city beginning in the 1970s—and accelerating in the 1980s—aggressively aided 
gentrification.  Of course, there were other policies that exacerbated the process; the city 114
government would also turn to zoning to stimulate development in an area, earning huge profits 
for the real estate and business elite of the city.  These zoning choices also directed where 115
gentrification occurred, and the process began to spread outward from the areas that were the 
nearest to New York’s corporate center in Lower Manhattan. 
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 As gentrification began to take hold in the outer boroughs, the city once again became an 
attractive place to live. Sharon Zukin notes that by the 1980s communities of artists stretched 
through the historic neighborhoods of Lower Manhattan; by the 1990s these communities had 
reached across the East River to Brooklyn and Queens, confirming the appeal of the 
neighborhoods they occupied relative to the homogeneous suburbs and corporate center.  At the 116
same time, the city government began to crack down on crime and homelessness via a “zero 
tolerance” policy, clearing the way for gentrification and development in previously dangerous 
working-class neighborhoods.  These policies brought people back to the city in droves: New 117
York’s population grew by 685,714 from 1989 to 2000, two-thirds of which was in Brooklyn or 
Queens.  The era of suburbanization and urban decay was evidently over by the end of the 118
twentieth century, despite the existence of Robert Moses’ infrastructure projects. 
 Though New York did become a safer and more desirable place to live during the last two 
decades of the century, there were also economic changes that helped bring people back to the 
city. Saskia Sassen notes that New York City’s shift to a service economy after the 
deindustrialization of the mid-twentieth century brought with it a transformation of class 
structure via large-scale developments and high-priced shopping districts.  These developments 119
were clearly geared towards attracting affluent residents, and in this sense they achieved their 
goal; the new high-income professionals of the service economy preferred urban living, and their 
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arrival accelerated gentrification in large areas of New York.  Sassen argues that this trend was 120
a central fact of gentrification in the city, particularly as in neighborhoods such as SoHo and Park 
Slope—poor and middle-income neighborhoods which came to contain highly priced 
commercial and residential buildings.  These new developments transformed entire 121
neighborhoods and large areas of the city. 
 The arrival of large-scale redevelopment via gentrification in New York City towards the 
end of the twentieth century bears a clear resemblance to the wholesale urban renewal projects of 
Robert Moses. This time, however, it was not low-income housing that took the place of poor 
neighborhoods but high-end luxury residential and office buildings. While these developments 
took hold gradually, block-by-block and building-by-building, John Logan notes that the effect 
of gentrification were just as complete as in wholesale urban renewal.  Therefore, while in a 122
certain sense gentrification owed much to the street-level perspective of Jane Jacobs, often the 
process had a larger effect that was similar to the impact of Robert Moses’ urban renewal 
projects.  
 The return of wealthy people to New York City towards the turn helped to accelerate 
gentrification, exacerbating social and economic inequalities. Richard Florida argues that both 
gentrification and inequality are direct results of what he refers to as the “recolonization of the 
city by the affluent and the advantaged.”  Florida explains this argument by noting how the 123
return of this class of people to the city pushes the remaining people into disadvantaged areas of 
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the city or further out into the suburbs.  This is mainly a result of the increased home prices that 124
the returning wealthy class brings back into the city, as these home prices make it impossible for 
the less advantaged to afford to stay in the neighborhood. Moody notes how this struggle for 
space played out by the Koch era in the 1980s, with a zero-sum character that trapped lower-
income working-class families by reducing low-cost available housing and pushing up the prices 
of existing and future housing.  This struggle continued throughout the last two decades of the 125
twentieth century and well into the twenty-first century. 
 Such struggle reveals that the effects of gentrification on the city as a whole at the end of 
the twentieth century were remarkably similar to some of the negative consequences of Moses’ 
work which ended up derailing his career and tarnishing his legacy. Just as Moses’ slum-
clearance projects cut into the already limited housing options for slum residents, gentrification 
removed thousands of low- and middle-income housing units. The last five years of the twentieth 
century included the construction of over fifty thousand units of housing, virtually none of these 
affordable, which increasingly pushed affordable housing off the market along with the spread of 
gentrification.  Unsurprisingly, this trend had a disproportionate effect on the city’s working-126
class and poor residents, many of whom became homeless.  Consequently, it is clear how 127
gentrification reinforced inequalities within New York City as the returning affluent class 
reassumed certain spaces and pushed out those who could not afford the increased competition 
for these areas. 
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 This competition for space had another dimension in terms of creating income inequality 
that was based on geography. The gap between the business elite who were moving closer to 
Manhattan and the working class whom their return was pushing out towards the outer boroughs 
grew rapidly in the last decade of the twentieth century, as high-paying professional and 
managerial jobs came to represent eighty percent of Manhattan’s employment compared to just 
over thirty-five percent for the city as a whole.  At the same time, a third stage of gentrification 128
was occurring in which the process became highly integrated with urban planning, as opposed to 
the sporadic gentrification from 1950 to 1980 and the gentrification that was intertwined with the 
economic restructuring of the 1980s.  It is this last phase that had the greatest impact in terms 129
of brewing inequality within New York City as the government now planned where gentrification 
was to occur in the same vein as how Robert Moses dictated where he would build his urban 
renewal projects. 
 Of course, this type of planned gentrification created huge profits for real estate 
developers not only in the city but also in foreign countries as well. Sharon Zukin notes that 
looser restrictions on foreign investment meant that beginning in the late 1980s, foreign money 
began to flow “like Perrier” into New York’s real estate market.  Rezoning became the city 130
government’s preferred tool of redevelopment towards the turn of the century, allowing the type 
of development that private investors saw as the most profitable by up-zoning to taller buildings 
on the wide avenues and waterfront while down-zoning to low-rise buildings on the side 
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streets.  Thus, the city government increasingly worked in conjunction with private developers 131
from all over the globe by rezoning and gentrifying the areas where these developers saw the 
highest potential for profit. 
 The similarities between this collaboration and the public-private relationships that 
Robert Moses fostered through his urban renewal projects are quite striking. Just as Moses 
worked with private developers to select underused and undervalued land as sites for housing 
projects, the city government was collaborating with developers to find similar land as sites for 
rezoning and subsequent gentrification. The existence of these similarities leaves a certain 
paradox, as the reaction to gentrification from the press and the public bureaucracy at the turn of 
the century was not anywhere close to their continued bashing of Robert Moses and his urban 
renewal projects. John Logan and Harvey Molotch provide a possible explanation to this 
contradiction; they argue that whereas many considered the arrival of poor, predominantly black 
residents in a “good neighborhood” to be a tragic example of urban decline, the arrival of 
affluent whites into a previously poor or black neighborhood was grounds for celebration due to 
the potential for higher rents.  Indeed, it seems that unlike with Robert Moses’ urban renewal 132
projects, the profits and economic benefits associated with gentrification at the turn of the 
century helped to shield its negative effects from public scrutiny.  
 Moreover, it is possible that the public and the press ignored these effects due to other, 
more positive consequences of gentrification. Logan and Molotch note that much historic 
preservation occurs with gentrification, as the city and private developers often combine to 
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provide whole neighborhoods with special benefits in order to create a particular charming 
ambience as well as the increased rents and fiscal benefits that follow.  Sharon Zukin notes 133
how this mix of old and new buildings was one of the hallmarks of Jane Jacobs’ vision, yet 
Jacobs did not acknowledge how gentrification could create a particular ambiance and 
commodity that few longtime residents or business owners could afford.  This explanation is 134
useful in resolving the paradox of gentrification’s many urban-renewal-like consequences and 
the lack of negative attention from the press, as the vision of Jane Jacobs had won out over the 
ideals of Robert Moses in the arena of public opinion. Though many elements of Moses’ ideas 
and career were certainly present in gentrification, a large part of the process centered around 
Jacobs’ vision of historic preservation and mixed-use neighborhoods.  
 As gentrification would progress into the twenty-first century, however, the process 
would mover further away from the ideas of Jane Jacobs and closer to the large-scale planning of 
Robert Moses. Of course, a seismic event within the first two years of this century forever altered 
New York City’s skyline and development path. In terms of real estate, the destruction of New 
York’s World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 destroyed six office towers, eliminating over 
13,000,000 square feet of office space and damaging 17,000,000 more.  However, perhaps an 135
even more seismic event in terms of New York’s development took place only two and a half 
months later as Mayor Michael Bloomberg took office in January of 2002. As 9/11 destroyed a 
large part of the city’s built environment and forced companies to leave Lower Manhattan, 
Bloomberg would seek not only to rehabilitate the city’s image and its spirit but also to reshape 
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its built environment on a scale paralleled only by the build-big era of Robert Moses.  The 136
administration would achieve this goal and much more. 
 The first plans that the Bloomberg administration set in motion were primarily about 
rebranding the city. In the decade or so before Bloomberg took office, New York City lost tens of 
thousands of office jobs as companies began moving back-office operations and some high-end 
employees across the Hudson River to places such as Jersey City and Hoboken.  Bloomberg 137
and his administration were well aware that the city’s high real estate and land prices as well as 
the cost of providing public service meant that it could not compete with New Jersey purely on 
the basis of cost.  Consequently, the administration began to adopt a branding-inspired 138
development strategy, one that reimagined New York City as a “value-adding product, an input 
into the postindustrial production process itself.”  As 9/11 had destroyed much of the city’s 139
prime office space and had scared many companies away, this development strategy was crucial 
in bringing back both office development as well as jobs, despite the high costs associated with 
operating in New York City. 
 It is essential to note the central elements of the Bloomberg administration’s urban 
development plan. Julian Brash notes how each of the two central elements of the plan was 
aimed at enhancing the city’s brand; firstly, the administration focused on creating a high-quality 
residential and recreation environment, including the facilitation of primarily luxury housing 
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throughout the city but especially in the gentrifying neighborhoods of Williamsburg/Greenpoint, 
West Chelsea, Harlem, and Downtown Brooklyn.  The second aim of the plan was to curtail 140
“inappropriate” residential development and protect “neighborhood character” in the single-
family-home neighborhoods of the outer boroughs.  Beyond a focus on residential 141
development, however, the Bloomberg administration also formulated plans for commercial 
development in a number of areas, with areas like Long Island City intended to compete with 
New Jersey for lower-cost, back-office space as well as other districts like Harlem and Flushing, 
Queens that would be geared towards industries that served local markets.  Lastly, the 142
administration’s plan emphasized parks and open space, especially along the waterfront areas 
where it planned to lengthen the network of bike paths and promote mixed-use development in 
specific waterfront sites such as West Harlem and Williamsburg.  Such an all-encompassing 143
plan reflected the ideals of both Jane Jacobs and Robert Moses, and it would come to have a 
drastic impact on the city that would alter their legacies. 
 The manner in which Bloomberg and his administration went about implementing this 
plan cemented New York’s rebranding as a luxury city. In the last decade of the twentieth 
century, the city’s population had increased by 695,276, while housing with rents at or below 
$500 a month had fallen by 517,345, more than half the total in 1990.  During his three terms 144
as mayor, Bloomberg’s administration granted over $600,000,000 in tax abatements and 
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exemptions for housing development—only four percent of which went to low-income housing 
while sixty percent went to upscale housing in Manhattan.  Of course, this spike in housing 145
development resulted in a simultaneous spike in housing prices, with the average price of a 
Manhattan apartment reaching $1,300,000 by 2004 while luxury apartments averaged over 
$5,000,000.  These exorbitant home prices would only end up further limiting the housing 146
options for the city’s working- and middle-class.  
 In an effort to solve New York’s affordable housing crisis, the Bloomberg administration 
adopted several strategies. One was the New Housing Marketplace plan, which stipulated the 
construction of 65,000 new affordable units by 2008.  This plan was part of a larger strategy as 147
the administration adopted inclusionary zoning, not only in high-density districts in Manhattan 
but in medium-density areas in the outer boroughs as well.  Although inclusionary zoning had 148
been in existence since 1987, it was only during Bloomberg’s tenure that it became central to the 
city’s affordable housing policies.  The ‘Designated Areas’ Inclusionary Housing Program 149
(IHP)  not only provided developers a thirty-three percent density bonus in exchange for a 
provision of twenty percent affordable units at or below eighty percent of the area’s median 
income, but it also allowed developers to combine these bonuses with tax exemptions like the 
421a, further subsidizing the cost of affordable housing development.  With these extensive 150
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subsidies, the Bloomberg administration hoped to facilitate new luxury residential development 
while also providing affordable housing for the class of people that were seeing an increased 
shortage in housing options as a direct result of this development. 
 However, the administration’s inclusionary zoning plans largely failed to provide 
sufficient affordable housing to go along with the thousands of new luxury housing units. Filip 
Stabrowski argues that while the administration justified inclusionary zoning as a tool for using 
the city’s strong housing market to generate affordable housing, in practice it has generated far 
too few affordable units, particularly in the areas that needed this low-income housing the 
most.  For example, the IHP that was part of a larger rezoning of Williamsburg/Greenpoint 151
generated only 949 affordable units—only thirteen percent of the total new units in the 
designated area.  Consequently, it is difficult to regard the results of the IHP as anything other 152
than widely disappointing.  Not only are these disappointing results especially present in the 153
case of Williamsburg/Greenpoint, but ironically these neighborhoods became one of the most 
heavily gentrified areas in New York City.  Consequently, there is a clear relationship between 154
inclusionary zoning policies and gentrification.  
 Within this relationship lies a certain paradox. Filip Stabrowski explains that by the logic 
of inclusionary zoning, it would only be possible to minimize gentrification through the 
production of affordable units by encouraging the process of gentrification itself through tax 
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incentives and density bonuses for luxury development.  Thus, affordable housing came to 155
serve not only as a symptom of gentrification due to the fact that it required a “hot” real estate 
market but also as a solution to gentrification as its primary displacement-mitigating 
mechanism.  The results of gentrification reveal the clear issues involved with both the 156
underlying logic of inclusionary zoning and the paradox that was central to the Bloomberg 
administration’s justification of the policy.  
 There is a substantial amount of empirical data on gentrification, but perhaps the most 
comprehensive study comes from New York University’s Furman Center. The Furman Center’s 
report reveals that from 1990 to the last year of Bloomberg’s tenure as mayor, mean household 
rent in the city’s fifteen gentrifying neighborhoods rose by thirty-four percent; during this same 
period, mean household rent citywide in fifty-five neighborhoods only grew by twenty-two 
percent.  Moreover, the study notes that in 2000, two years before Bloomberg took office, 157
households that earned eighty percent of the median area income could afford over seventy-
seven percent of the recently available rental units in gentrifying neighborhoods; a year after 
Bloomberg’s mayoralty had ended, that share had fallen to less than fifty percent.  The 158
empirical data is clear: rather than providing more affordable units, the Bloomberg 
administration’s initiatives not only raised rents in gentrifying neighborhoods but also severely 
limited their supply of affordable housing. 
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 Moreover, the administration created more of these gentrifying neighborhoods 
throughout the city through large-scale rezoning and development. Bloomberg, his deputy mayor 
Dan Doctoroff, and Amanda Burden—the director of the Department of City Planning—rezoned 
over thirty-seven percent of New York City, promoting high-density along transit corridors and 
preserving low-density neighborhoods.  These rezonings prioritized specific land uses: Scott 159
Larson notes that of the ninety-five rezonings the administration approved between 2003 and 
2008, one-quarter converted manufacturing land to some other use, while none added available 
industrial land.  Additionally, Larson points out that these rezonings only encouraged real 160
estate speculation, driving up rents and housing prices in neighborhoods that were already 
growing increasingly costly.  It is clear that the Bloomberg administration centered its plans 161
around rezoning, and by extension it brought large-scale development and gentrification to the 
areas that the administration deemed underused, undervalued, and thus most profitable for real 
estate developers. 
 With these criteria, it is not surprising that most of the Bloomberg administration’s 
rezoning projects and the gentrification that followed were focused in certain types of 
neighborhoods. The administration targeted low-income and minority neighborhoods in 
particular, such as the Melrose neighborhood of the Bronx, where the poverty rate in one census 
tract decreased by over twenty percent due to a large influx of new development that attracted 
higher-income residents.  Bloomberg and his administration also targeted the city’s waterfront, 162
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as they planned for a dramatic greenery under the Brooklyn Bridge, a luxury development down 
the Queens and Brooklyn shore, and a giant park in place of a garbage dump in Staten Island.  163
The focus of Bloomberg’s rezoning efforts can thus be categorized into two themes: large-scale 
redevelopment in predominantly low-income, minority neighborhoods and a transformation of 
the city’s waterfront via similar development as well as parks. It is clear from this categorization 
that the Bloomberg administration was drawing heavily on the ideals and development 
philosophy of Robert Moses, a man who prioritized development in low-income neighborhoods 
and along the waterfront. 
 Nonetheless, there were many signs that the ideas and work of Jane Jacobs still held 
powerful influence in terms of urban policy and development. Brash notes that community 
organization and planning—directly linked to anti-urban renewal movements as well as the 
grassroots ideals of Jane Jacobs—remained a vibrant source of opposition to large-scale 
development.  As Bloomberg’s Deputy Mayor Dan Doctoroff acknowledged almost eight years 164
after he left his post, the administration made a point to redevelop areas where there was no real 
community and where it would displace the least amount of people.  Doctoroff also described 165
the administration’s approach as block-by-block and building-by-building, with an eye towards 
working with communities as well as preserving or enhancing existing neighborhood character 
through downzoning and landmark preservation.  This type of rhetoric suggests an implicit 166
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knowledge within the Bloomberg administration of a need to respect the widely accepted vision 
and ideas of Jane Jacobs. 
 To be sure, Bloomberg and his officials made sure to add a nod of approval to Jacobsian 
ideals whenever they were promoting a project or policy. For instance, the administration viewed 
zoning as a mechanism for actively fostering density and mixed uses, and it portrayed rezonings 
as a means toward the end of creating Jacobs’ preconditions for a diverse neighborhood.  More 167
significantly, Bloomberg’s development agenda actually rested on the Jacobsian notion that 
healthy neighborhoods meant a healthy city, and the administration devised its own formula of 
protecting neighborhood character in middle- and upper-class residential neighborhoods through 
downzoning and landmark preservation.  Additionally, Deputy Mayor Doctoroff’s long-term 168
strategic plan centered around the idea of New York as a city of neighborhoods and even 
included an emphasis on design.  It is clear that the administration made a concerted effort to 169
adhere to the vision of Jane Jacobs in its urban development plans.  
 However, the effects of these plans reveal that a lot of this effort was merely window-
dressing in order to limit popular opposition. Larson notes that despite the administration’s 
portrayal of zoning as a Jacobsian tool for fostering a diverse neighborhood, the actual intended 
effects of rezoning projects more closely resembled Moses-style redevelopment via a wholesale 
transformation of large areas of New York City.  Moreover, the administration advocated an 170
aggressive new round of creative destruction that harkened back to the methods of Robert 
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Moses, complete with a readiness to invoke eminent domain and public-private partnerships to 
secure participation for real estate developers.  Despite the Bloomberg administration’s Jacobs-171
oriented public portrayals of its policies and projects, in practice these initiatives owed much 
more to the planning practices of the Moses era. 
 Moreover, the Bloomberg administration ushered in an era of mega-projects that truly 
mirrored the top-down, large-scale planning of Moses’ career. Bloomberg planned most of the 
up-zonings required to promote these projects along the city’s waterfront, primarily in former 
industrial areas.  These plans often included open public spaces, ensuring city residents access 172
to the water while also providing developers with an amenity that would increase the value of 
their product.  Such was the nature and scope of this new wave of mega-projects that it seemed 173
as though the administration was directly attacking the prevailing vision and wisdom of Jane 
Jacobs with plans that were almost direct disciples from the Moses era.  Indeed, Jacobs herself 174
even weighed in with a letter addressed to Bloomberg himself regarding the proposed rezoning 
of the Williamsburg/Greenpoint waterfront, arguing for the support of the community’s 
alternative plan which preserved the neighborhood’s existing scale.  The letter ultimately had 175
no effect on the plans of the administration; thus, it seems that after over three decades, the 
vision of Jane Jacobs had lost substantial ground to the ideals of Robert Moses. 
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 To be sure, contemporary mega-projects in New York have taken shape through a process 
not unlike the large-scale development of the Moses era. Julian Brash notes how in these 
projects, the use of public-private entities relatively unaccountable to the public or legislatures 
have allowed real estate interests to avoid popular opposition by establishing a coherent, state-
sponsored development strategy that served these interests.  The Atlantic Yards development 176
plan in Downtown Brooklyn—the first attempt at a master plan since the time of Robert Moses
—originated with the development firm of Forest City Ratner Companies, a principle developer 
in the borough which had already built three large projects in that particular area.  As the 177
project originated through a single developer’s initiative, no other firms had the opportunity to 
bid on the development despite a substantial contribution of public money.  This type of public-178
private agreement in which the state and city government granted development rights to a single 
developer without competition was quite similar to the agreements that permeated the urban 
renewal projects of Robert Moses’ career. 
 Just as both the press and the public vehemently voiced opposition to those Moses 
projects, they did the same in response to the similar types of dealings that were central to the 
Atlantic Yards development. Community organizations also echoed Jane Jacobs in contending 
that the buildings involved in the plan would destroy the neighborhood character of 
predominantly low-rise Brooklyn, casting shadows over adjacent neighborhoods and increasing 
traffic congestion.  Just as Moses was able to steamroll his opposition for most of his career 179
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before public opinion shifted against him permanently, Bloomberg was able to do the same—
particularly in the rezoning proposals for the Barclays Center, the professional basketball arena 
at the center of the Atlantic Yards plan.  Through mega-projects, the Bloomberg administration 180
as a collective thus came to represent the individual practices of Robert Moses.  
 Not only would the administration overcome popular opposition in getting the Atlantic 
Yards development off the ground, it would do so with many other mega-projects throughout the 
city. By the end of Bloomberg’s rein, massive construction projects were underway at Ground 
Zero in Lower Manhattan, Williamsburg’s East River waterfront, and elsewhere.  Although 181
Bloomberg and his officials would consistently contend that they were working closely with 
communities throughout these projects, in actuality the administration only considered 
neighborhood concerns and development priorities when they conformed to its pre-established 
agenda.  Therefore, it is evident that the administration was employing a top-down planning 182
strategy that was closely related to Robert Moses’ career practices and ideas. 
 The story of one mega-project on Manhattan’s far west side in particular was a clear 
display of the Bloomberg administration’s Moses-like vision. This swath of open parking lots, 
industrial areas, and transportation infrastructure was often referred to as the last great frontier in 
terms of development in Manhattan.  Brash points out that New York City’s most powerful 183
business elites and real estate developers had long targeted the area west of Eighth Avenue from 
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about Thirtieth street to Fifty-ninth street as a site for expanding the Midtown Manhattan central 
business district (CBD), with proposals for commercial development dating back to the 1920s.  184
None of these proposals had come to fruition, and thus the far west side had been a site of the 
most grandiose plans and bitterest defeats for New York’s real estate elite.  Previously, the most 185
comprehensive redevelopment effort was the Lindsay administration’s 1969 plan, which included 
30,000,000 square feet of office space, new hotels, and a cruise ship terminal on the Hudson 
River.  With the defeat of this plan, the area would remain undeveloped for over three decades. 186
 However, the far west side’s underdevelopment throughout the late twentieth century was 
not due to a lack of effort. The commercial redevelopment of Times Square in the 1980s began to 
push the edge of the city’s Midtown CBD westward, while both the Koch and the Dinkins 
administrations proposed plans for further expansion to the Hudson river that ultimately did not 
materialize.  The Hudson Rail Yards in particular became the focus of development efforts; 187
owned by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), development of the yards would be 
exempt from normal city review processes while close proximity to Midtown, Penn Station, and 
the Hudson River made for an ideal development site.  With the construction of support 188
columns in the yards that possessed the capacity to support a deck in the 1970s, development 
proposals quickly emerged in the last two decades of the twentieth century.  The state 189
government proposed the site as a location for a new stadium for the New York Yankees, the 
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city’s premier professional baseball team, and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani was a big proponent of 
this plan.  When this plan didn’t materialize, Giuliani himself proposed the site as a location for 190
two new stadiums—a new Madison Square Garden and a new stadium for the New York Jets of 
the National Football League, both served by an extension of the 7 subway line.  Popular 191
opposition would derail this plan as well, leaving the area still underdeveloped when Bloomberg 
took office in 2002.  
 It would be reasonable to assume after these failed redevelopments that, unlike in the 
Moses era, popular opposition would derail whatever plan the Bloomberg administration could 
come up with for Hudson Yards. However, the administration’s proposed plan brought together 
real estate developers, planners, corporate executives in a unified front in an effort to overcome 
this opposition.  It worked; the City Planning finalized a rezoning that would facilitate large-192
scale development on the eastern portion of the rail yards in 2004, and by 2009 a rezoning of the 
western portion was complete as well.  With these zoning changes in place, the Bloomberg 193
administration had laid the platform for the redevelopment of Hudson Yards—in doing so, it had 
overcome a significant political barrier. 
 However, there were still a myriad of other barriers that this coalition of power would 
have to knock down once they presented a comprehensive development plan. Firstly, the 
administration developed a financing plan in 2004 in which Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and 
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JPMorgan Chase acted as senior underwriters for the bonds that funds the rezoning.  This 194
arrangement raised red flags among city officials: The New York City Bar Association issued a 
report on the plan in 2007 noting that this type of financing scheme was highly resemblant to the 
large-scale commercial development of the 1970s that helped cause the fiscal crisis.   Indeed, 195
this public-private agreement included the same type of development subsidies as the incentives 
involved in the 1970s. 
 If the financing scheme was similar to the downtown developments of the 1970s, 
however, the Bloomberg administration’s proposed plan differed in that it was centered around 
hosting Olympic Games along with commercial development. This bid began to form a few 
years before Bloomberg, but it was a central element in his administration’s development agenda. 
Much of the enthusiasm behind the city’s olympic bid—dubbed NYC2012—was the possibility 
of locating a stadium and Olympic facilities in Hudson Yards while surrounding them with large-
scale commercial development.  Of course, residents of the area were not too thrilled at the 196
prospect of redevelopment on this scale: many had long opposed the area’s redevelopment and 
they had organized the social institutions needed to oppose the plan.  These community 197
organizations eventually helped defeat the plan and New York lost its Olympic bid, but the 
redevelopment of the area seemed inevitable despite clear opposition.  
 Indeed, as the area’s rezoning was already finalized, new development proposals 
continued to flow in. The Bloomberg administration resuscitated the redevelopment of Hudson 
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Yards after the Olympic defeat, including it as part of a larger rezoning plan in many areas of the 
city.  This rezoning allowed for the office and residential development that the administration 198
was pushing along with a stadium and the extension of the 7 subway line that Giuliani had 
included in his plans, forming a clear picture for Hudson Yards as an entirely new, mixed-use 
waterfront neighborhood for New York City. Brash argues that this picture appealed to “the 
Moses lying in the hearts of elite urban planners.”  Indeed, the administration seemed to be 199
aware of the Moses-like nature of the project as well as the public’s attitude towards Moses. This 
awareness led the government to stress the idea of this development as “urban place-making,” 
thereby evoking the ideas of Jane Jacobs by portraying a vibrant, mixed use neighborhood.  200
Despite this tactic, the plan’s eighty-story office buildings and football stadium were clearly not 
in line with Jacobs’ best planning practices which used the cobblestone streets and low-rise 
buildings of the West Village as a model of vital urbanism.  Brash notes that once the 201
administration ended up removing the stadium, however, the proposal lost its last real planning 
hindrance.  As a result, there was little standing in the way of Hudson Yards’ redevelopment 202
and the Bloomberg administration had used top-down planning practices in the same manner as 
Robert Moses to overcome sustained opposition. 
 In order to finalize the area’s redevelopment, the MTA had to agree on a developer for its 
land. Five companies made approached the state authority with a development proposal, and in 
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March 2008 the MTA agreed to award Tishman Speyer the rights, only for the developer to back 
out six weeks later and the bid passing to Related Companies.  By 2009, around the same time 203
the City Council had finalized the rezoning of the yards’ western portion, the council had 
approved a final revised plan from Related that included thirteen buildings encompassing over 
18,000,000 square feet of mixed-use space, featuring an indoor shopping mall and a city-
sponsored arts center to go along with fourteen acres of public space.  Such size and scope 204
made Hudson Yards the largest mixed-use private real estate development in the history of the 
United States.  However, it would not have materialized without the important role of the 205
public sector and the public-private agreement between the MTA and Related Companies, a 
partnership that was not unlike the urban renewal agreements of Robert Moses’ Title I Housing 
program.  
 Earlier this year, over a decade after the approval of Related’s plan, the eastern portion of 
Hudson Yards opened to the public. Detractors point to the neighborhood’s $25,000,000 cost 
which included over $6,000,000 in tax breaks and government subsidies, arguing that despite a 
promise from the developers that the neighborhood would bring over 55,000 jobs they should 
have to pay their own way and not rely on such extensive subsidies.  However, supporters of 206
Hudson Yards argue that these subsidies and incentives will pay vast dividends in terms of this 
job creation as well as job retention, as much of this financing went toward the extension of the 7 
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subway line and other improvements that will make the surrounding area an overall better 
neighborhood.  Despite these arguments, the sheer size Hudson Yards means that the 207
development merits a much more nuanced discussion, one in which dollar figures and 
government incentives tell only a small part of the story.  
 As a result, the reaction to Hudson Yards in the New York press has centered around 
many different aspects of the development project. While most of the coverage has been 
negative, some members of the press have also pointed out some positives of the project, such as 
Alexandra Schwartz of the New Yorker. Schwartz argues that the goal of Hudson Yards is to 
impress, and in this sense it succeeds via the sheer scale of its five gleaming office and 
residential towers, an observation deck that will open next year, and a city-sponsored arts space 
spanning 200,000 square feet.  Additionally, Schwartz observes that the glass, metal, and stone 208
interior of the shopping mall perfectly portrays tasteful wealth.  These positive observations are 209
exceedingly rare, not only in Schwartz’s article itself but throughout the New York press. 
 Much of the negative attention towards Hudson Yards has centered around the luxury and 
extravagance that the development represents. Michael Kimmelman, the architecture critic for 
The New York Times, argues that Hudson Yards is, “at its heart, a super-sized suburban-style 
office park, with a shopping mall and a quasi-gated condo community targeted at the 0.1 
percent.”  Similarly, Schwartz argues that Hudson Yards is a neighborhood of the future, a 210
future that the Bloomberg administration imagined as it prioritized turning New York into a 
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luxury city.  Schwartz also refers to Hudson Yards as a luxury enclave and a high-end corporate 211
park, with a number of amenities that make sure its wealthy residents barely have to leave the 
neighborhood.  Indeed, the housing prices and rents at Hudson Yards do reveal that the 212
neighborhood is targeting the top income-earners; one-bedroom apartments rent for at least 
$5,000 a month, while a duplex penthouse in one of the towers sells for over $30,000,000.  213
These exorbitant housing prices do reflect the luxury nature of Hudson Yards, lending credence 
to the arguments of people like Kimmelman and Schwartz that it represents a quasi-gated 
enclave within New York’s urban landscape. 
 Additionally, the tenants of the office buildings and shopping malls as well as restaurants 
portray Hudson Yards as a neighborhood for the top echelon of society. The seven floors of the 
mall are a grouping of high-end shops such as Neiman Marcus, Fendi, and Dior, while major 
corporations like WarnerMedia and L’Oreal USA have agreed to move their headquarters to 
Hudson Yards’ office towers.  Moreover, a number of celebrity chefs such as Thomas Keller 214
and David Cheng will be running the restaurants in the development.  With luxury shops, big 215
businesses, and these high-end restaurants respectively dominating the area’s retail and office 
spaces, it is impossible to ignore the argument that Hudson Yards is merely a wealthy enclave 
within the urban fabric of New York City. 
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 For all of the area’s luxury, the nature, process, and design of Hudson Yards are the true 
sources of the negative media coverage. It is therefore unsurprising that all of these aspects 
resemble the vision and practices of Robert Moses. In terms of its nature, Hudson Yards is indeed 
an exercise in urban place-making, in creating a new neighborhood for the city of New York. 
This whole concept of place-making does indeed have its flaws: Logan and Molotch argue that 
places are different from commodities in that they have certain sentimental value that make them 
indispensable for their users.  Moreover, the authors note that geographical communities are 216
not merely containers of activity, as is the case with Hudson Yards, but rather individuals are 
vital in fostering community.  Perhaps these arguments help to explain the negative reaction 217
surrounding Hudson Yards. Regardless, the development of the rail yards has sparked new 
development in the surrounding area, and a new place has begun to emerge on the far west side 
of Manhattan.  While the exact type of place is evidently different from the places that Moses 218
created through his urban renewal projects, it does bear many similarities.  
 Members of the press seem to be aware of these similarities, and they have reflected this 
awareness in their negative coverage of the project. In terms of the design, Kimmelman notes 
that the fourteen acres of open space in Hudson Yards merely seems like a different version of 
Moses’ towers-in-the-park housing projects, with office towers rather than apartment complexes 
surrounding a landscaped plaza.  Kimmelman goes so far as to argue that Hudson Yards is 219
nearly devoid of urban design entirely, with the neighborhood declining to blend into the city 
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grid.  Of course, Moses’ housing complexes also eschewed design and did not fit in with the 220
surrounding built environment or the urban form of New York City. Due to this same lack of 
urban design, Schwartz argues that Hudson Yards feels more like a nice airport terminal with the 
High Line as its moving concourse to the Lower West Side, slicing through the existing urban 
fabric in a manner not unlike how Moses’ highways cut through the city’s built environment.  221
Thus, it is clear how the lack of design in Hudson Yards resembles both Moses’ antipathy 
towards design in his urban renewal projects as well as his highways. 
 The similarities between Hudson Yards and Moses’ work continue in relation to the 
redevelopment and review process. Partly due to the fact that this redevelopment plan was a 
better alternative to the construction of a stadium on the site and partly due to the public-private 
agreement between the MTA and the developers, Hudson Yards was able to sail through both the 
public and environmental review processes and overcome popular opposition.  The City 222
Council even agreed to pay $359,000,000 in bond interest payments when revenue for the 
development fell short of projections, cementing Hudson Yards as a symbol of the role of 
government in spurring development that benefitted private real estate developers.  Robert 223
Moses typified this role perhaps more than any other figure in New York history, while other 
aspects of the project have combined to tie his legacy with contemporary mega-projects and 
Hudson Yards in particular.  
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 As Moses’ enduring legacy has been largely negative, this association is central to 
negative coverage of Hudson Yards in the New York media. However, the project will not be 
complete for at least a couple of years, meaning that if it is successful it could help alter the 
Moses’ legacy as well. Kimmelman notes that if New Yorkers flock to the arts building and the 
mall, the neighborhood will become less like a luxury enclave.  If the Vessel—the large public 224
art structure at the center of the plaza—also brings more foot traffic to the area, Hudson Yards 
will become further integrated as a New York City neighborhood. The pending success of 
Hudson Yards thus has various implications not only for the city government and the developers 
that built it, but for the legacy of Robert Moses as well.  
 If the large-scale gentrification and mega-projects of the Bloomberg era had already 
began to shift Moses’ legacy, Hudson Yards promises to further this trend. Nonetheless, it is clear 
from the real estate development practices of the twenty-first century that the vision and 
practices of Robert Moses have not disappeared from the mind of the public as entirely as many 
would believe. This fact is significant in that it implies that the legacy and impact of Moses’ 
career is changing, particularly in relation to the period after his career in which the city 
government made a conscious effort to show how new projects and policies were different from 
his work and ideas. Conversely, government administrations in the twenty-first century have 
realized there is no denying the similarities between contemporary real estate practices and 
Robert Moses projects, despite the long-standing negative public perception surrounding his 
career. 
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 Consequently, the question becomes about whether these modern practices are having a 
positive effect on New York City, particularly as the legacy of Robert Moses has become tied to 
their success. If modern real estate practices are helping the city, then it should be clear that 
Moses’ ideas and vision had a positive impact on the city despite his many flaws and mistakes. 
Of course, there is no concrete way to measure the effects of contemporary real estate practices 
in terms of positives and negatives. However, certain empirical evidence goes a long way in at 
least identifying these effects. Two years after Bloomberg’s tenure as mayor was over, the total 
value of New York’s real estate was roughly $2,900,000,000,000, a total equal to the entire Gross 
Domestic Product of the United Kingdom, the fifth-largest national economy in the world.  225
Regardless of the effects on the city’s population, the Moses-like building of the twenty-first 
century cemented New York’s place as the most valuable city in the world and thus would seem 
to aid his enduring legacy.  
 Of course, one cannot simply ignore the effects that this large-scale development has had 
on many city residents, particularly in terms of increasing the value of real estate. As 
development has not reached every part of the city, certain areas have become substantially less 
valuable than others; the average Manhattan apartment cost over $2,000,000 as of 2015, while 
the median home value in most of the city was $600,000 or substantially lower.  Nonetheless, 226
the sharp increases in home prices and real estate values in many parts of the city have still 
pushed up rents in the areas that have not experienced large-scale development. The Furman 
Center study notes that the share of households in the city who spent more than thirty percent of 
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their pre-tax income on rent rose by eleven percent from 2000 to 2014 citywide, with non-
gentrifying neighborhoods actually experiencing the sharpest rises in rent-burdened 
households.  Evidently, even the areas that have been isolated from the development of the 227
twenty-first century have also experienced an increase in housing costs and real estate values. 
 However, this increase is relatively little compared to gentrifying neighborhoods. Rents 
in these areas rose by 34.3% from 1990 to 2014, only rising by 13.2% in non-gentrifying 
neighborhoods.  Rents in three gentrifying neighborhoods—Williamsburg/Greenpoint, Central 228
Harlem, and the Lower East Side/Chinatown—have risen by over fifty percent during the same 
period.  With such sharp increases in rents, it would be reasonable to assume that gentrification 229
has forced out many of the residents in these areas, particularly as the process has mostly 
occurred in low-income neighborhoods. To be sure, this displacement has been a central theme in 
negative coverage towards gentrification among the media in the twenty-first century. 
 While this chapter has already noted the many similarities between the process of large-
scale development and gentrification and the practices and ideas of Moses, an important 
distinction must be made in relation to this displacement. While it is simply a fact that Moses’ 
projects displaced thousands of city residents, it is much more unclear to what extent 
gentrification has bred similar displacement. It seems that the media has greatly exaggerated the 
displacement involved in gentrification, as the Furman Center study even acknowledged that 
although the number of people in New York living below the poverty line has decreased since 
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2000, it is possible that these poor residents have been able to lift themselves out of poverty.  230
Indeed, there has been little empirical data on gentrification-bred displacement. If the legacy of 
Moses is now tied to the process of gentrification and large-scale developments in the twenty-
first century, the lack of clarity regarding displacement can only be a positive thing for this 
legacy. 
 Beyond displacement and real estate development practices there are also many other 
elements of contemporary New York City that suggest a more positive view of Robert Moses’ 
impact. One of the hallmarks of the negative public perception towards Moses was his racism; 
for example, Caro notes that some of his pools were white-only environments, with some left 
unheated as Moses thought this would dissuade black residents from using the pools.  231
However, every single pool that Moses built in New York had heating capabilities.  Moreover, 232
Moses actually built many pools and recreational facilities on underused pieces of land in black 
neighborhoods such as Harlem, equipping them with recreation facilities in a way no one else 
could have.  Indeed, photos of Moses pools from this century reveal that many of his pools are 233
predominantly used by minorities, such as the Betsy Head Pool in Brooklyn and the Cortona 
Pool in the Bronx.  Whether or not this is what Moses intended is besides the point; in terms of 234
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impact, it is clear that he endowed minority neighborhoods with pools and parks that have 
remained in use well after his career. 
 Another element that has been central to Moses’ negative legacy since his career ended is 
his infrastructure work. Frequent New York Times contributor Ginia Bellafante argues that New 
York today is actually two conflicting cities in terms of its built environment: the luxury 
metropolis imagined by the Bloomberg administration and a deteriorating urban landscape 
around it, one which Moses scarred through his highway ambitions.  Moreover, Bellafante 235
notes that many of Moses’ highways are now crumbling and in desperate need of repair, such as 
the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, which Moses did not design to withstand a daily onslaught of 
150,000 cars and trucks.  To be sure, Moses’ highways and bridges did leave certain areas 236
severely disadvantaged and have struggled to stand up to contemporary traffic patterns. 
 However, it is relatively impossible to argue that the city would be better off without 
Moses’ infrastructure projects. Hilary Ballon and Kenneth Jackson note that Moses’ bridges, 
expressways, and parkways are so indispensable over fifty years on from their completion that 
one cannot imagine New York City without them.  The mere fact that Moses was able to build 237
so many of these infrastructure projects has become positive for his legacy as well, as a layered 
political process has made it very difficult to complete ambitious public work projects since the 
1980s.  Moreover, Jackson argues that it is highly unlikely that New York would have 238
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rebounded so severely from its dark period in the 1970s and early 1980s without Moses’ 
works.  As a result, Jackson believes that Moses was an overall positive influence for the city, 239
and this changed legacy will cement him as a key figure in the rise of New York rather than its 
fall.  Jackson is clearly not alone in this belief—Michael Powell of The New York Times notes 240
that an influential group of historians and planners are increasingly arguing that Moses deserves 
credit for the rise of the city rather than its temporary fall in the immediate aftermath of his 
career.  These arguments are evidence that Moses’ legacy is taking a markedly positive turn in 241
the twenty-first century.  
 This turn is also reflected in Moses’ urban renewal work. Just as the media has chided the 
developers of Hudson Yards for its design which seems to set it apart from the surrounding urban 
fabric, many in the press criticized Moses’ super-block approach in his Title I projects. While 
there were certainly design failures in these projects, most are flourishing today largely due to 
the gentrifying effects of these projects on their surroundings and to New York’s overall 
revitalization. Additionally, Moses’ Title I template also included certain features that have 
helped facilitate the reintegration of these super-blocks into the urban fabric.  Despite Title I’s 242
obvious shortcomings under Moses, the projects helped tackle New York’s persistent affordable 
housing issue while their regenerative features were part of an innovative set of urban renewal 
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strategies that are still effective today.  Coupled with the impact of his infrastructure projects, 243
the work of Robert Moses in the realm of urban renewal has also turned out to be another boon 
for his changing legacy.  
 While it is clear that this legacy is becoming increasingly positive, many of Moses’ 
mistakes and negative characteristics are undeniable. Even the most ardent revisionists recognize 
that Moses was highhanded, racist, and contemptuous towards the poor, yet they point to 
evidence that his grand vision and strong will planted the seeds which allowed the modern city to 
flower.  Additionally, time has helped cover many of Moses’ more egregious errors, such as the 244
elegant playgrounds that he designed for the white and comfortable which are now recreational 
spaces for a predominantly minority population.  Owen Gutfreund also notes that Moses fell 245
from power at the exact right time; if he was able to proceed with certain highway projects such 
as the Lower Manhattan Expressway, he may well have permanently undermined the city’s core 
by further easing suburban and peripheral travel.  Robert Fishman argues that we can be 246
thankful these plans never materialized and recognize why Moses merits his negative reputation, 
yet we must also recognize that the city and its surrounding region would not be functional today 
if it weren’t for Robert Moses.  This argument seems a concise, accurate way of looking at the 247
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legacy of Robert Moses; while he made some glaring errors, his work and ideas have had a vital 
and lasting impact on New York City. 
 This impact is especially evident relative to the careers and vision of Moses’ critics, 
particularly Jane Jacobs. As is evident in the public role in contemporary large-scale 
development, elected officials more concerned with real estate interests than community planners 
have submerged the self-guiding communities that Jacobs idealized.  Moreover, Jacobs did not 248
call for stronger zoning laws that would encourage a mix of uses nor permanent rent controls that 
would encourage a mix of residents and businesses.  It is evident in New York that such laws 249
would have been influential in preserving the neighborhood character that Jacobs prioritized. 
Sharon Zukin notes that Jacobs had a misplaced distrust in the capacity of state power in 
protecting authenticity, for without state laws neighborhoods do not have any defense against the 
market forces that breed development.  This distrust represents Jacobs’ biggest error in terms of 250
contemporary New York. Though her ideas eventually won out over Moses towards the end of 
his career, Jacobs’ failure to recognize the capacity of government in protecting neighborhoods 
and her sole reliance on community organizations does not reflect the reality of twenty-first 
century New York City; large-scale development is now a shared priority among the government 
and developers alike, while community organization is relatively powerless to stop it. 
 However, there is evidence that community organization still holds some clout in 
stopping this type of development. In Long Island City, for example, popular opposition recently 
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derailed a public-private agreement between New York City and Amazon for the company’s 
second headquarters. Opponents of a deal which included over $3,000,000,000 in government 
incentives and tax breaks strongly outnumbered supporters.  This opposition on the surface 251
originally seemed futile—New York Governor Andrew Cuomo and city mayor Bill de Blasio had 
constructed the agreement explicitly in a way that severely diminished the ability of local 
politicians to stop it.  Yet, popular opposition among community organizations and the city 252
press ended up defying the long odds that this type of agreement stacked against it, as Amazon 
backed off its headquarter project in Long Island City earlier this year. With the power of local 
politicians severely limited due to the nature of Amazon’s agreement with the city and state, the 
only thing that could have stopped the development was popular opposition; its success reveals 
that the Jacobsian ideals of community organization are still somewhat alive despite the Moses-
like building of the twenty-first century.  
 It remains relatively unclear what the legacy of Jane Jacobs will be in the future as these 
ideas continue to lose influence. By extension, it is also unclear what could happen to the legacy 
of Robert Moses in terms of the ongoing development in the twenty-first century. As 
gentrification and urban development reach further out from the traditional Manhattan core and 
new office markets like Long Island City begin to gain more traction, it is certainly possible that 
some of Moses’ ideas and career work could come to harm his increasingly positive legacy. By 
the same token, Jacobs’ ideas could make a comeback as residents in more areas of the city push 
back in the face of this ongoing development. The next chapter of this paper will look at these 
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possibilities in an attempt to answer the larger question of how the ideas of these two important 
figures could could impact the city’s future and how their legacies could change as a result.  
!74
Chapter Three: Looking to the Future 
 New York’s current landscape reveals that the city is set up for an interesting and 
uncertain future. Manhattan is growing ever upward with the construction of super-tall office and 
ultra-luxury residential towers, while development on the island continues to reach northward as 
well. In the outer boroughs, large-scale urban development has reached neighborhoods much 
further out than those directly adjacent to the city’s Manhattan core, forever altering the low-rise 
skyline and character of many of these areas. Moreover, the growing threat of climate change 
will certainly have an impact on the city with the preservation of its waterfront now paramount, 
particularly as many of the new high-rise districts are along this waterfront. This chapter will 
look at how future developments are likely to play out in New York City—by extension, it will 
also examine how these developments could continue to affect the prevalence of the ideas of 
both Robert Moses and Jane Jacobs and thus how their legacies could change once more. 
 Beginning in the city’s traditional core of Manhattan, the increasing verticality of New 
York City inevitably will have an impact on the legacies of these two figures. More than twenty 
super-tall buildings—buildings over 984 feet in height—are now completed, in the development 
stage, or currently under review in New York.  A look at a map of these projects reveals that all 253
but one are located in Manhattan, while many of them are ultra-luxury residential towers that 
largely occupy the area near the southern edge of Central Park in the heart of Midtown 
Manhattan.  While this area of the city has possessed a high-rise character with commercial 254
offices and luxury residences for decades, the arrival of super-tall buildings and these residential 
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towers display that the low-rise, mixed-income ideals of Jane Jacobs are increasingly under 
threat as New York moves into the future.  
 To be sure, the new wave of towering ultra-luxury residential buildings is evidently 
targeting residents of the very top income bracket. In fact, so many of these towers have popped 
up along the southern edge of Central Park that the press and public have nicknamed the area 
“Billionaire’s Row.”  The home prices in these new residential towers are indeed so exorbitant 255
that it is likely only billionaires will be able to afford to live there. For example, founder and 
CEO of the global hedge fund Citadel, Kenneth Griffin, recently bought a penthouse at the very 
same building for $238,000,000—the most expensive residential sale in the history of the United 
States.  This particular building required evicting dozens of middle-class tenants from rent-256
stabilized apartments and demolishing twenty-story building.  With increased home prices that 257
are inevitably unaffordable to these previous residents, the new tower has significantly altered 
the scale and demographic of this particular locale. Whereas those rent-stabilized apartment 
provided vital housing for the old building’s occupants, Mr. Griffin may not even live in his new 
home most of the year—after all, in the three block stretch that is “Billionaire’s Row,” 57% of 
the apartments are vacant ten months of the year.  This statistic is a direct result of the 258
exorbitant home prices in this area of New York City; these prices are breeding trophy 
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apartments, homes where the global superrich look to park their money as both a real estate 
investment and a marker of their wealth. 
 As is evident on “Billionaire’s Row,” often these superrich buyers from around the world 
do not inhabit homes they purchase for most of the year. However, Richard Florida points out 
that this absentee ownership is becoming a trend throughout Manhattan. In the first eleven years 
of the twenty-first century, absentee owners and renters increased the number of apartments they 
occupied in the borough by nearly 15,000—a jump of almost seventy percent.  Though Florida 259
argues there are not enough super-rich people around the globe to “deaden” large parts of New 
York City, he acknowledges that these absentee owners or renters and the trophy apartments 
where they park their money result in lights-out buildings, making certain areas of the city like 
“Billionaire’s Row” decidedly less vibrant.  As a result, it is clear that the rising verticality and 260
ultra-luxury residential apartments in Manhattan are breeding dull luxury enclaves within the 
borough. These enclaves suggest that the hallmarks of Jane Jacobs’ ideal city—vibrant, mixed-
use, and mixed-income neighborhoods are losing relevance. 
 This trend is seemingly likely to continue, particularly due to the amount of towers still 
under construction and those only in the proposal or review stages. Moreover, developers are 
moving beyond the ultra-luxury of  “Billionaire’s Row” to other adjacent areas in Manhattan, 
building tall but not necessarily targeting the absentee owners and top-income earners of that 
stretch of the city. Of course, there has been neighborhood opposition to many of these projects, 
yet it has been largely unsuccessful. For example, neighborhood preservation group “Landmark 
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West” recently attempted and failed to stop the construction of a 775-foot building that Extell 
Development proposed for West 66th Street, where apartments range from just 1,800 to 3,000 
square feet and thus are evidently not targeting foreign billionaires.  With these smaller units, it 261
would seem as though at least Jane Jacobs’ emphasis on density was still prevalent in the minds 
of the city planners who approved the project.  
 However, these city planners also dictate the city’s zoning regulations, and in this sense 
they have almost utterly ignored the Jacobsian ideal of density. Although the neighborhood 
opposition to Extell’s 66th Street project was ultimately unsuccessful in stopping the building’s 
construction, it did reveal how developers are taking advantage of “the void,” a striking loophole 
in these zoning regulations which allows residential towers like these to grow so tall and 
command such high prices.  As the city’s zoning regulations only limit the number of stories a 262
building can have depending on its location and lot size, they set no limit on the height of any 
particular floor. This oversight has allowed developers to claim that some floors need to be 
higher in order to contain building mechanicals, when in reality they are just adding height to the 
building by creating empty space, in turn allowing them to create apartments on higher floors 
with better views and higher prices.  The result of this lapse in zoning regulations is that these 263
new luxury towers are in fact doing nothing for density despite their extreme heights; the Extell 
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project will only contain 127 units.  Therefore, it seems that the last hallmark of the Jane 264
Jacobs vision for an ideal city is also no longer a priority in New York City.  
 The Department of City Planning (DCP) is attempting to defend some of the hallmarks of 
this vision. While this agency will likely not be able to reverse the trend of absentee ownership 
and ultra-luxury development, it does have a role to play in promoting density by correcting “the 
void” loophole in the city’s zoning regulations. A look at the department’s website reveals that 
they have recently proposed a zoning text amendment to eliminate the loophole, the overuse of 
which they note has resulted in residential towers that “disengage with their neighborhoods.”  265
With community opposition powerless in the face of the increasing ultra-luxury residential 
development in Manhattan that is threatening to destroy the hallmarks of Jane Jacobs’ vision, a 
planning agency has somewhat ironically stepped in to protect these ideals. 
 Indeed, a further examination of the department’s website reveals that it has extended this 
protection to many other initiatives around the city, particularly in relation to the large-scale 
redevelopment taking shape in outer borough neighborhoods. For example, the agency recently 
published a set of “Waterfront Design Guidelines” for Long Island City, which aim to foster a 
sense of place as the area continues to change by requiring a network of “publicly accessible 
open space” and buildings which reflect the “industrial and creative character” that has defined 
the neighborhood.  This type of rhetoric reflects the ideas of both Jane Jacobs and Robert 266
Moses via references to neighborhood character and open space, respectively, revealing the 
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extent of the government agency’s efforts to protect Jacobsian ideals in the face of increasingly 
Moses-like development in New York City. 
 Of course, this government agency also directs the rezoning projects that Jacobs so 
despised, which are instrumental in breeding development on a similar scale to Moses. With 
most of the land in Manhattan already developed and real estate prices skyrocketing, these 
rezonings have not only expanded the island’s development northward, but they have also 
increasingly pushed beyond the confines of Manhattan into the outer boroughs. The development  
and gentrification of Harlem—a historically black, low-income neighborhood—culminated in a 
rezoning of 125th Street at the heart of the neighborhood for denser residential development on 
the wide avenues.  The arrival of gentrification and city rezoning this far north in Manhattan 267
was a sign of the island’s northward development trend, a trend which shows no sign of slowing 
down. 
 As Manhattan is only an island, its land area is finite; development can only progress so 
far in one direction, and thus the city has increasingly looked to rezone areas outside of 
Manhattan. These zoning changes have transformed some of the historically poorest 
neighborhoods of New York City; the DCP is working on an expansion of the Harlem River 
Waterfront District in the South Bronx, building on the work of two previous rezonings to 
“ensure the continued growth and resiliency” of the neighborhood.  These projects are not only 268
happening north of Manhattan—the DCP has developed a Community Plan for the neighborhood 
of Bushwick in Brooklyn which their website claims is a “coordinated planning effort” among 
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developers, the city, and members of the community with strategies for further zoning 
changes.  The scope of the city’s plans for outer borough neighborhoods reveals the continued 269
push of development out of Manhattan as the twenty-first century continues. 
 Most of this development is of a Moses-like nature do to its large scale, and it is 
increasingly transforming entire neighborhoods. The revisionists who have helped establish 
Moses’ more positive legacy argue that a vision like his is needed to transform the remaining 
underused or undeveloped areas of New York City, citing the complete transformation of areas 
like Long Island City, Williamsburg, and Atlantic Yards as examples.  Indeed, the rezoning 270
efforts that have helped facilitated these transformations closely resemble the top-down planning 
of the Moses era and seem to overlook or even outright ignore the neighborhood preservation 
ideals of Jane Jacobs. The neighborhoods outside of Manhattan are losing their low-rise 
character, with high-rise districts popping up in areas beyond those directly adjacent to the city’s 
core. 
 The reality of Long Island City in particular reflects how the ideas and values of Jane 
Jacobs could continue to lose influence New York City. As the city already rezoned the area in 
the early twenty-first century, it now boasts a vertical skyline with apartment buildings that have 
brought 2,000 people while driving out 600 low-income residents.  Although the community 271
was able to stop the Amazon project that would have inevitably driving out more of these 
residents, it is likely that neighborhood opposition will remain powerless in stopping the area’s 
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continued wave of development. So far, it has managed to maintain a bustling blend of industrial 
uses, artists, and tech firms while keeping the area affordable, yet preserving this mix is likely to 
become increasingly difficult.  In one decade from 2006 to 2016, developers built over 11,000 272
condominiums and rental apartments in Long Island City, with another 22,500 apartments in 
either planning or development stages.  These apartments are hardly affordable; in the forty 273
new buildings since 2010, the average home price is over $1,000,000.  As a result, it is likely 274
that home prices in the area will continue to rise, further pricing out the low-income residents 
that have defined the neighborhood. 
 Moreover, the rise of Long Island City’s office market is increasingly threatening to 
destroy the mixed uses that have defined the neighborhood. Advocates of the area’s longtime 
manufacturing businesses have become increasingly concerned that the efforts to spur new 
development in Long Island City will lead to a larger loss of space for industrial uses.  Real 275
estate players have increasingly looked at Long Island City as a low-cost office alternative to a 
Manhattan office market with prices at or near all-time highs, pushing office rents in the area up 
from around twelve dollars a foot to around thirty.  Indeed, there is clear empirical evidence 276
that industrial space is shrinking; by 2020, eighty percent of the industrial firms in the 
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neighborhood will see their leases expire, while property owners already converted 2,100,000 
square feet of rentable industrial space for more lucrative uses as of 2016.  As a result, it is 277
clear that Long Island City is experiencing a destruction of its mixed-use, low-income character. 
As development continues in the area, it is likely that this trend will only intensify, resulting in a 
loss of Jacobsian ideals in yet another New York City neighborhood. 
 The city government is likely to continue to facilitate similar large-scale development 
increasingly further out from Manhattan. This continued expansion of large-scale development 
and gentrification well into New York’s outer boroughs undoubtedly reflects more of Robert 
Moses’ vision than that of Jane Jacobs, suggesting that their legacies will continue to become 
more positive and negative, respectively. However, one aspect of Moses’ career will increasingly 
threaten to harm his legacy while not significantly impacting the legacy of Jane Jacobs: his 
negative attitude towards mass transit. As development continues to move further out from 
Manhattan, the errors of Robert Moses in mass transit could derail his legacy’s positive 
progression. 
 The first chapter of this paper examined Moses’ extensive work in building roadways for 
the city and its surrounding region. Of course, Moses built these parkways and expressways and 
bridges almost solely for the automobile, which he evidently saw as the future of New York City.  
While these did provide car users the most modern highways, the massive construction costs 
involved took public money away from the city’s mass transit system which prevented this 
system from meeting the city’s true needs.  Under Robert Moses, the Triborough Authority and 278
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the Port Authority had a combined 1,250,000,000 at their disposal, some of which Moses could 
have directed towards improving the city’s mass transit system—yet all of which he decided to 
spend on his bridges and expressways.  Moreover, when Moses did build transportation 279
facilities he built them strictly for the suburbs, rather than the inner-city ghettos that actually 
needed them due to the fact that their low-income residents could not afford to own cars.  280
Robert Moses’ decisions regarding how to spend the money that was at his disposal and where to 
spend it are a clear display of his blatant disregard for mass transit and the families that did not 
own cars in New York City.  
 To be sure, this disregard harmed the city’s mass transit system, and as development 
stretches out further from Manhattan as the twenty-first century progresses Moses’ legacy could 
suffer. Caro notes that at the time he was writing his biography on Moses in 1974, New Yorkers 
were still using the same subway and railroad tracks laid between 1904 and 1933 with as the city 
had not built a single mile since.  Caro also makes a broader claim that from the time Moses 281
came to power over the city’s roadway system a year later until the end of his career in 1968, the 
city’s mass transportation system had declined from the best in the world to quite possibly the 
worst.  While this particular is lacking in evidence that could substantiate it, it is clear that 282
Robert Moses presided over a period of stagnation in the city’s mass transit system, leaving New 
York behind other cities of the world in this sense by the time he left power. 
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 An emphasis on mass-transit and New York’s overall transportation system should grow 
as gentrification and urban development continue into the outer boroughs. Joel Kotkin and 
Wendell Cox argue that by 2053, cities will not have increased substantially in density but rather 
they will have dispersed considerably, as they did in the 2000s, when 95% of metropolitan 
growth took place more than ten miles from downtown areas.  Were this prediction to 283
materialize, areas beyond the current boundaries of New York City such as Yonkers and 
Bronxville or the immigrant enclave of Forest Hills in Queens would experience major 
development. Such development could cast a more intense light on the flaws of Robert Moses in 
relation to mass transit, one that could hurt his new positive legacy.  
 However, an examination of the era in which Moses worked suggests that he built his 
highways and bridges in direct response to a trend that was gripping the entire country. Voters in 
Detroit chose a highway over public transportation in the 1920s, while Los Angeles added 900 
miles of highways and 21,000 miles of paved streets throughout the twentieth century—both 
totals which substantially eclipsed those of New York in the same period.  Therefore, it would 284
have been evident to Moses that the cities throughout the United States were prioritizing the 
automobile, and as a result he followed suit.  
 In a narrower sense, Robert Moses also acted in response to trends that were affecting 
New York City. Kenneth Jackson notes that by the time Moses got his first grip on power in 
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1924, “automobile traffic was strangling New York.”  In order to alleviate congestion yet still 285
prioritize the automobile as the rest of the country was, Moses focused on buildings his roads 
and bridges, addressing a great need for the City of New York. While he perhaps should have 
paid more attention to other needs such as in mass transit, Moses had revitalized the city’s road 
network over all five boroughs and in the suburbs by the time he left power in the 1960s, 
complementing a then-sterling mass transit system.  Moreover, this transit system stayed in that 286
state for most of Moses’ career, and as a result no one was effectively clamoring for a transit-
based alternative to his auto-focused transportation work.  Therefore, it is clear how both trends 287
in New York City and in the country as a whole should absolve Robert Moses of some future 
blame for his flaws in mass transit.  
 Moreover, Moses’ legacy should not suffer too much from his oversights in mass transit 
as this flaw not had a particularly significant negative impact on New York City since his career 
ended. From Robert Caro’s perspective in the 1970s, it would have indeed seemed as though 
Moses had plunged the city’s mass transit system into crisis with little room for future 
improvements; in the following decades, however, ridership and safety have greatly increased, 
suggesting that this crisis was not as dire as Caro believed.  Today, New York is the least auto-288
dependent city in the nation as Moses’ roads have become integrated with the city’s mass transit 
system.  In fact, Robert Fishman notes that the city has thrived as it has repaired and renewed 289
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the already existing subway infrastructure while bringing it into balance with the complex road 
network that Moses had built for the city by the end of his career, and as a result he argues a 
place must be found for Moses’ legacy even in terms of mass transit.  Although Moses 290
undoubtedly made some mistakes and gross oversights regarding transit, these errors have not 
harmed the city in the present day; on the contrary, without Moses’ highways and bridges the 
city’s mass transit system would likely have never gotten to the place it is at today.  
 Nonetheless, it does seem as though there will be an increased focus on mass transit in 
the future primarily due to growing congestion in New York. Kotkin and Cox note that nearly all 
higher income cities in the world today rely principally on the automobile, and in the cities that 
don’t like New York, residents pay for it in much longer travel times, suggesting that even with 
increased density citizens may not opt for mass transit over cars.  Of course, were this 291
prediction to come true there would be numerous implications for the continued development 
and expansion of New York City as well as for the legacy of Robert Moses. The city government 
has made efforts in the twenty-first century to make sure this prediction turns out false, yet 
Mayor Bloomberg lost his most ambitious offensive against cars in 2008 when the State 
Legislature defeated his “congestion pricing” plan as a way to discourage the use of cars.  If 292
the few New Yorkers that use cars continue to stick with them despite the city’s mass transit 
improvements as well as continued expansion and development into the outer boroughs, 
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congestion could get out of hand and Moses’ failures in mass transit could come back to haunt 
him. 
 In particular, this congestion would be detrimental to the city in terms of the growing 
threat of climate change. New York is particularly vulnerable in this regard; the city is in the top 
ten of port cities around the world who are most exposed to flooding, while its protection against 
flooding is just a fraction of better protected cities like London.  In order to combat the threat 293
of climate change, most cities in the world have turned to densification as a way to eliminate the 
need for the automobile, with this density regulated by restrictive land use regulations.  While 294
these restrictions could help New York by limiting its continued urban expansion, it is also 
possible that these restrictions could end up increasing congestion if car users in the city don’t 
give up their preferred mode of transportation. Should New York’s congestion problem end up 
worsening in the future, it would likely harm the city’s resilience towards climate change as well 
as the automobile-focused legacy of Robert Moses.  
 However, even Moses himself was partially responsible for new alternatives that New 
York City has implemented to alleviate this congestion. By the end of Bloomberg’s mayoral 
tenure in 2013, the city had added over 450 miles of bike lanes, mostly carved from the city’s 
roadways.  Of course, Robert Moses built more of these roadways than anyone else.  Without 295 296
his roads, it is unlikely that New York City would have the complex web of bike infrastructure 
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that it does today and will continue to develop into the future. Although Moses’ roads motorized 
New York City, it is clear as the twenty-first century progresses that they will continue to provide 
the basic infrastructure for new transportation networks that could discourage car ownership in 
the city and therefore alleviate congestion.  
 The use of Moses-era infrastructure for new transportation methods should help protect 
his legacy even as the threat of climate change increases and the automobile becomes 
increasingly taboo in New York City. Moreover, the city government has again adopted a top-
down planning approach in terms of dealing with climate change. For example, the DCP has 
adopted a comprehensive program to revitalize the city’s waterfront, reflecting the desires of 
Moses throughout his career to prioritize the city’s coastal areas, although in the modern day the 
priority in these areas has become private development projects rather than highways. Dubbed 
the “New York City Waterfront Revitalization Program,” the initiative establishes policies which 
include waterfront planning to promote development projects and long-term preservation of the 
waterfront as sea levels continue to rise, while also bridging over any conflicts between these 
two goals.  The priorities of this program coupled with its top-down planning nature reflect that 297
even the ideas and approach of the man who prioritized the automobile over everything else will 
remain useful in protecting New York City against ongoing climate change.  
 However, if climate change progresses as many in the scientific world expect it to, there 
will not be the same waterfront there for the city government to preserve. Mayor Bloomberg 
realized that climate change presented an ever growing threat to New York after Hurricane Sandy 
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in 2012, and he built a new fortification in the aftermath of the storm.  However, Ted Steinberg 298
notes that if the highest sea level estimates do hold up, over 800,000 New Yorkers will live with 
the possibility of being swamped.  Many of these residents are low-income minorities living in 299
New York’s floodplain, people whom the city government often undercounts and therefore leaves 
at a disadvantage when it comes to emergency relief or preparation.  While New York 300
inevitably requires a top-down approach in terms of a citywide program to limit the increasing 
effects of climate change, it cannot ignore the needs of these specific communities and thus must 
tailor policies for individual areas.  
 In this sense, the city’s approach to dealing with climate change again lies somewhere 
between the top-down planning approach of Robert Moses and the neighborhood preservation of 
Jane Jacobs. While Jacobs didn’t recognize the role of the government in preserving 
neighborhoods, climate change has made this role perhaps more important than it ever was in 
preventing large-scale development or gentrification. However, certain neighborhoods and 
communities in New York City are much more vulnerable to continued climate change than 
others, and in this regard the roles of community organization and neighborhood preservation 
become vital as well. As a result, the DCP has established an initiative called “Resilient 
Neighborhoods,” a place-based planning approach to identify neighborhood-specific strategies 
such as zoning or land use changes to make certain areas more resilient to future climate change 
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effects.  This initiative seems a mix of top-down planning in the form of rezoning with an 301
additional, more neighborhood-specific focus.  
 The city government has centered much of its neighborhood-specific approach around the 
most vulnerable areas of the city, particularly those in the floodplain. Of course, much of this 
approach still involves rezoning and other planning strategies that Jane Jacobs denounced, but 
the tailoring these strategies specifically for different areas around New York that are the most 
vulnerable is consistent with Jacobs’ vision. Even in a citywide study, the DCP created special 
zoning rules in the floodplain which allow for recovery and rebuilding while also gathering input 
from homeowners and community practitioners to understand how to improve special zoning 
regulations specifically for residential, commercial, or industrial neighborhoods.  While zoning 302
in the past directed large-scale development through a top-down planning process, it seems that 
as climate change continues to threaten New York zoning will increasingly be used as a 
community preservation tool in order to push back against rising sea levels and flooding.  
 New York’s climate change initiatives and its efforts to change the zoning laws that are 
allowing for ultra-luxury residential towers along “Billionaire’s Row” display that the city 
government is paying attention to the approach of both Jane Jacobs and Robert Moses as it 
prepares for the future. While the continued urban expansion of the city does seem to reflect 
more of a Moses-like approach in terms of the top-down process of rezoning and large-scale 
development on the waterfront and beyond, it is clear from the rhetoric of the city government 
that it still has the ideas of Jane Jacobs  in its collective mind. Therefore, it is likely that the 
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legacies of both figures will still have a profound impact in New York City as the twenty-first 
century progresses. 
 Nonetheless, history has shown that changes to both legacies as time moves forward are 
inevitable, although the nature of these future changes is ambiguous at best. While many argue 
that New York needs the vision of someone like Robert Moses to deal with future problems for 
the city brought on by climate change and urban expansion, Robert Caro doesn’t think so 
because in his mind, Moses “ignored the values of New York.”.  To be sure, Moses did ignore 303
some of these values: he ignored the needs of the urban poor who did not own cars and he 
ignored the needs of the entire city in terms of mass transit; however, New York City has 
rectified his mistakes using the very infrastructure that he put into place during his career. What 
is left is the undeniable impact that Robert Moses had on the city both in terms of his approach 
and the projects themselves. How the sands of time will affect this impact in the future is unclear.  
 New York’s urban environment will continue to transform itself with more development 
in the outer boroughs, an increased emphasis on mass transit, and initiatives to limit the 
increasing effects of climate change. All of these changes will have some sort of impact on the 
enduring legacy of Robert Moses, his career, and his influence on the city. By the same token, it 
is also likely that future alterations in New York’s urban landscape will have an effect of similar 
proportion on the legacy of Jane Jacobs, Moses’ most prominent critic. However, ongoing 
planning practices reveal that these legacies are moving closer to one another rather than further 
apart. As New York’s development continues and the city continues to change, perhaps the 
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legacies of two of the most important opposing figures in New York history will find even more 
common ground.  
 There are many possibilities for the enduring legacies of both Robert Moses and Jane 
Jacobs. As New York’s future remains uncertain, so too do these legacies that are so intertwined 
within the city’s urban environment. On the one hand, it is possible that New York’s continued 
expansion will only increase the city’s dependency on the automobile and thus negatively impact 
public opinion regarding Moses as well as his neglect for mass transit and a cohesive 
transportation system. On the other hand, gentrification and urban development in the outer 
boroughs could reveal Moses to be one of the more important visionaries in all of urban history 
as these top-down processes transform whole neighborhoods and destroy much of the character 
and authenticity that Jacobs idealized. A third possibility is that suburban development cements 
the importance of Moses’s vast road network in connecting Manhattan to the outer boroughs. Of 
course, these are not the only possibilities; no one truly knows how New York will change into 
the future. 
 At this moment in time, these numerous possibilities for the future make it relatively 
impossible to predict with any form of certainty what will happen to the legacies of Robert 
Moses and his most famous critic. Rather, we can only examine where these legacies truly stand 
today; Moses has gone from reviled to respected since Caro wrote his seminal work in 1974, 
while many of Jane Jacobs’ ideals have been ignored as New York has moved to a new period in 
its development. However, in a certain sense these legacies have also moved closer together, with 
development in New York during the twenty-first century suggesting that these figures are no 
longer polar opposites in the realm of urban theory. Rather, New York City’s landscape and 
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development practices not only in the present but perhaps in the future as well reveal that the city 
government and even private developers have come to respect and acknowledge the ideas, 
careers, and visions of both Robert Moses and Jane Jacobs. While the legacies of both figures 
have changed over time and are likely to do the same in the future, they currently stand as 




 This paper has attempted to provide a reexamined legacy for one of the most 
controversial figures not only in the history of New York City but also in urban history as a 
whole. In the centuries prior to Robert Moses, New York began expanding northward from its 
traditional center of downtown Manhattan as a result of the Industrial Revolution and then 
outward with the incorporation of Greater New York at the end of the nineteenth century. In this 
sense, New York’s development has not changed much as Manhattan continues its northward 
march and expands beyond its limits as an island with development spilling over into the outer 
boroughs. However, in most other contexts New York’s development has taken a drastically 
different shape even relative to the years immediately following Moses’ career. Today, New York 
City is in many ways first among all cities and stands at the very top of the global hierarchy.  
 Despite the negative perception that has surrounded him beginning in the last decade or 
so of his career, Robert Moses and his ideas have played an instrumental role in allowing New 
York to achieve this status. The first chapter of this paper details his work and approach 
throughout his career, beginning with his parks in the 1920s and progressing all the way through 
his work in roadways and urban renewal. In doing so, this chapter provided an examination of 
how Moses gained power. Moses provided recreational facilities for an increasingly crowded 
New York City, he built the largest road network the world had ever seen by the end of his career 
and created the five-borough metropolis that New York is today. However, the first chapter also 
concludes with an explanation of why the public and press reviled Robert Moses by the end of 
his career due to the negative consequences of his highways and urban renewal schemes. These 
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projects displaced thousands of New Yorkers and accelerated the movement of residents out into 
the suburbs and ushered in a period of urban decay for New York. 
 The second chapter of this paper argues that Moses was not principally responsible for 
this suburbanization and establishes the bulk of the main argument for a reconsideration of his 
legacy. Beyond the argument that Moses should not bear all of the blame for the state of New 
York in the years following his career, this chapter contains arguments and evidence for the role 
his ideas have played in revitalizing the city since the 1980s. In particular, gentrification and 
mega-projects such as the case study of Hudson Yards have helped establish New York City as 
the most valuable city in the world through processes not unlike those of the Moses era. These 
processes include similar public-private agreements, top-down planning practices, and the ability 
to stymie opposition that defined Robert Moses’ career. As such, this chapter argues that his 
legacy has become tied to contemporary development practices in New York City; while these 
practices have inevitably had some negative effects on the city’s residents, as a whole they have 
revitalized New York following the worst period in its history in the 1970s. As the legacy of 
Robert Moses has become tied to real estate development in the twenty-first century, the 
revitalization of New York City has established a new, positive legacy for New York’s master 
builder.  
 This paper has also acknowledged that this legacy is subject to change, just as it has since 
Robert Caro published his book in 1974, only six years after Moses finally fell from power. 
Moses inevitably made some mistakes in his career, and the first chapter of the paper details how 
these mistakes contributed to the destruction of his legacy at the end of his career. As New York 
moves into the future, mistakes such as Moses’ oversights in mass transit and prioritization of the 
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automobile could take on new meaning with the increasing threat of climate change and a 
subsequent increase in the city’s emphasis on discouraging car usage.  
 In this area, therefore, there is a need for more research from urban studies scholars to 
examine the various possibilities for the legacy of Robert Moses in the future. Perhaps more 
research on how his legacy has changed in the present day relative to the end of his career and its 
immediate aftermath could be useful in predicting what will happen in the future. Indeed, an 
examination of exactly what has changed Moses’ legacy in the modern day beyond what this 
paper has covered could help reveal how his legacy could change again. While many scholars 
have written such pieces with similar aims to the main goal of this paper in terms of reexamining 
Moses’ legacy in a more positive light, there has been almost no research so far on how his 
legacy could again change in the future. 
 Robert Caro wrote what remains to be the most detailed and expansive work on Robert 
Moses and his career, yet today it is clear that many of his arguments were short-sighted. Caro 
failed to see how New York could improve in the future and how Moses’ legacy could change as 
a result. Presumably, Caro believed with some certainty that he was correct in 1974 when he 
argued that Moses would likely never recovery from his tarnished legacy at the end of the career. 
After all, Moses had left the city to deteriorate as never before and as it has not done since. Over 
forty years later, the revitalization of New York City has proved Caro wrong; Moses’s 
infrastructure projects still stand as perhaps even more vital components in the city landscape, 
his parks serve most residents of the city and Long Island, and his ideas have been instrumental 
in contemporary real estate practices and developments. 
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 However, the adoption of Moses’ ideas and practices in contemporary New York also 
suggests that his legacy has been a product of time. Whereas Moses’ legacy was overwhelmingly 
negative when New York was suffering greatly in the years after his career, it has turned positive 
as the city as cemented its status at the top of the global urban hierarchy. By the same token, if 
New York slips from this pole position in the future, someone like Robert Caro could revisit 
Moses’ legacy yet again. Therefore, there is a need for further research on what can be done to 
prevent such a slip, whether it be in terms of New York City’s affordable housing crisis or its 
vulnerability to the increasing threat of climate change. Moreover, further research on climate 
change should examine what would happen to New York’s economy and particularly its real 
estate values if the city fails to adapt to the threat. If rising sea levels submerge New York City 
both literally and figuratively, Moses could yet again become a reviled figure in the city’s 
ongoing history. 
 Just as Robert Caro erred in believing the legacy of Robert Moses as a reviled figure in 
New York history would endure for centuries, it would neither be correct to argue his 
reestablished legacy will endure nor that it will revert back to its 1970s form. Rather, it is only 
accurate to say that Robert Moses has come a long way in the decades since the destruction of 
his legacy in the immediate aftermath of his career. The final question that Caro raises in his 
book asks why the public was not grateful for Robert Moses in 1974. In 2019, the answer to this 
question has become clear; Moses was high-handed, perhaps racist, certainly contemptuous, and 
made many mistakes throughout his career. Yet today, contemporary real estate practices and 
other phenomena in New York reveal that Moses’ projects and ideas have been instrumental in 
bringing New York City out of its dire state in the 1970s, and thus there should be renewed 
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